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With the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice the President of the Commission gained in 
influence vis-à-vis the College of Commissioners resulting in a process of 
Presidentialisation.  At the same time the European Parliament gained in influence 
over the European Commission resulting in a process of Parliamentarisation. The 
aim of this thesis is to explain these processes. Why are we seeing such a leadership 
emerge within the Commission, and why is the EP gaining in influence? 
Employing intergovernmental theory, I show that the member states retain the formal 
power to revise the Treaty framework, and may be said to be the primary actors. 
Using this right they have made the Commission an efficient institution while at the 
same time limiting the influences of the Parliament. Employing rational choice 
institutionalism I arrive at slightly different conclusions.  Focus on the European 
institutions’ adaptation of the formal provisions, this interpretation shows that the 
institutions influence their own roles and functions as they maximise their mandates. 
A third and final analysis employing organisational theory focusing on the 
institutional environment show that norms and ideas are used as arguments for the 
Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission, and seem to be used 
to legitimise the institutions.  
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Institutions have been said to be static in their nature. This statement may not hold 
true for the European Commission (henceforth Commission). Given a limited role as 
the European Communities were set up, it is now a large organisational structure. The 
Commission encompasses roles and functions normally associated with both 
executive branches of government and secretariats of international organisations, 
giving it a hybrid character (Egeberg 2003). The role of the President of the 
Commission is no exception. Parallel to the growth of the Commission, the 
relationship between the President and the College of Commissioners, and the 
Commission and the European Parliament (EP) has changed, altering with it the 
nature of leadership in the European Union (EU).  
These processes have been incorporated in the Treaties and practices of the Union. 
From being nominated as one of the Commissioners, the President now nominate the 
Commissioners together with the member-states, as well as selects the political 
profile of the Commission. At the same time the nature of the balance between the EP 
and the Commission has shifted. From being viewed as a bystander, the Parliament 
has grown into an important actor. Not only does it approve the, to an increasing 
degree the party profile of the EP seems to influence the composition of the 
Commission, and it’s President.  
Why are we seeing such a leadership emerge within the Commission, and why is the 
EP gaining in influence? How can it be explained? Can it primarily be seen as a result 
of negotiations in the inter-governmental conferences (IGC) or should it be viewed as 
a result of informal processes? Can it be explained by looking at the European 
Council, or should other actors be taken into account? Is it a rational adaptation or a 
reflection of ideas?  These are the questions I will answer.  
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1.1 Presidentialisation and Parlamentarisation  
How can we identify indicators for the evolving role of the European institutions? I 
believe we can isolate two major developments in later years. First, the President of 
the Commission has gained influence vis-à-vis the Commissioners, giving the 
Presidency more the role of primus than the traditional primus inter pares, resulting 
in a process of Presidentialisation.  Second, the EP has increased its power over the 
composition of the Commission, resulting in what some might label 
Parliamentarisation of the inter-institutional relations. Increasingly, the Commission 
as a whole, and the President in particular, can be held responsible not only to the 
Council, but also to the Parliament.    
Put rather shortly these processes can be traced in the following way.  From the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA, 1997) onwards1, the President has been given the power 
to allocate and re-allocate the portfolios of the Commissioners (Nugent 2001: 69).  
As I will argue, this fundamentally changes the relations both internal and external to 
the Commission. The following Treaty of Nice (2001) formalised the arrangement 
that any member of the Commission would resign upon the wishes of the President, 
thus cementing the special role of the Presidency.  As the first post-enlargement 
Commission, the Barroso Commission showed us that the larger countries can no 
longer expect the more important portfolios. Barroso gave off an impression of a 
strengthened presidential prerogative in the allocating of positions (Bache & George 
2006:214). Furthermore, the nomination and election of the Barroso Commission 
seems to have been influenced by the 2004 European Parliament elections. Going 
beyond the formal Treaty provisions the Barroso nomination seems to have been 
conditioned by the election results (Beukers 2006). The two processes can be seen in 
Table 1 below.  
                                              
1 The nomination process of the Commission and its President was reformed already with the Treaty on Europrean Union 
(1992,TEU). In the TEU the Parliament gained the right to be consulted on the President-nominee, the President himself 
gained the right to be consulted on the Commissioner-nominees. The Commission as a whole was subject to approval by 
the Parliament (Nugent 2001: 62). However, as a selection of data has to be made, the TEU was left out of the time frame 
of my thesis.  
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Table 1: Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation 
Treaty  Treaty of 
Amsterdam 
Treaty of Nice  
Presidentialisation Power of 
allocation 
Political guidance 




Parliamentarisation Veto power on 
President 
nominee 
 EP elections 
condition  choice 
of President 
 
My dependent variable can thereby be isolated to two observable processes, 
formalised in two consecutive treaties, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of 
Nice. These processes encompass both the increased presidential prerogatives and the 
increased parliamentary influence. Why is it of interest to trace the process through 
formal Treaty revisions? I will return to this in the following chapters, but a short 
remark will be made. Treaties govern the EU. They give the overarching guidelines 
for the functioning of the Union. This is where the Commission is given its mandate 
and where the roles and functions of the President is specified. Changes in the Treaty 
framework are therefore good indicators of actual change. Member states are taken to 
be the primary actors of Treaty negotiations. However, I don’t believe the institutions 
are without influence in these processes, and much is to be learned from the way they 
interpret the treaty provisions. The adaptation of the Treaties by the European 
institutions will therefore be included as explanatory variables. However, the study 
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will be limited to the formal provisions guiding the work of the Union and the 
adaptation of these. Structures outside of these will be excluded2.  
Is there anything to be gained from isolating these two processes? One could answer 
no. The Commission Presidency in inherently interlinked with the general evolution 
of the Commission, furthermore, it is linked to the overall processes taking place in 
the Union as a whole. The argument holds true for the European Parliament as well. 
Its influences over the Commission may not be separated from its standing in the 
Union as a whole. In contrast, I will argue for the separation of these processes. If in 
fact the Presidency of the Commission has grown in influence, and leadership within 
the organisation is changing, it is important to unravel explanatory factors. If the 
Parliament is growing in influence over the Commission this points to a new 
institutional dynamic it should be elaborated on. Is it a process pushed forwards by 
the member states, or does its evolution lay solely in the hands of its incumbents? 
Can it be traced back to institutional dynamics, or should it be seen as part of a larger 
trend?  Not only will it provide us answers as to how the Commission works as an 
institution, but also to the institutional dynamics of the EU as a whole. By 
highlighting its evolution, we might be able to learn more not only about formal, but 
also informal aspects of institutional change.  
1.2 Typology 
Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation refer to particular institutional structures, 
and an evolution of these, necessarily moves towards an end. I therefore see a need to 
elaborate the main concepts of this thesis, and make clear what is entailed by these. 
As parliamentary and presidential political systems come in different shapes and 
forms, it is important to make these explicit. I do so by presenting a typology of the 
                                              
2 In the Treaty framework the Parliament and the Commission have been given the prerogative to lay down their working 
arrangements through Rules of Procedure (Treaty on European Union 1992). Though these processes may be seen as 
formal processes, in the following analysis they will , for clarifying reasons, be referred to as informal processes. Treaty 
negotiations and IGCs will be referred to as formal processes.   
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concepts. These are to be treated as ideal models or measures to assess the processes 
by, not the end goal of the processes. Though they are shown here as two separate 
processes and two different concepts, as will become clear, I do not hold them to be 
separate, and the presence of one does not exclude the other.  
Presidential and parliamentary regimes can be said to differ on three accounts. While 
the executive is not held politically responsible to the legislature in presidential 
systems, the executive emerges from the legislature in parliamentary systems. 
Second, heads of governments in presidential systems are popularly elected, while in 
a parliamentary regime, the prime minister is selected by the legislature. Lastly, as 
only the President has been given the mandate to govern in a presidential system, the 
President is also given the executive and political responsibility. In parliamentary 
regimes it is the executive as a whole that is held responsible to the Parliament, and 
indirectly, through a chain of delegation and accountability, to the people (See 
Lijphart 1999;  Poguntke & Webb 2005; Østerud 1996). The differences can be seen 
in Figure 1 below, the presidential system can be seen on the left hand side, the 
parliamentary on the right. 








The People The People 
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If these are the ideal forms of parliamentary and presidential systems, how then can 
we describe the processes strengthening these? In their study of the 
Presidentialisation of politics, Poguntke and Webb isolate the process down to two 
developments, “(a) increasing leadership power resources and autonomy within the 
party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly leadership-centred 
electoral processes” (Poguntke & Webb 2005:5). The process of Parliamentarisation, 
on the other hand, can be viewed as (a) an increasing responsibility of the executive 
towards the legislature, through a positive vote or the lack of a vote against the 
executive, and (b) the legislatures increase in influence over the composition of the 
executive.  
Though these processes are drawn from state structures, I hold them to be relevant for 
the study of the EU. What could be the end result of such processes within the 
Commission? A fully presidential system might include a directly elected President 
of the Union, free to select his own Commission and irresponsible to the Council and 
the EP. A full parliamentary system would include a Commission fully responsible to 
the peoples of Europe through the Parliament and or the Council. Neither seems to be 
the case today. As I will argue, the Commission seems to have been influenced by 
both ideals and it might be moving towards a combination of the two. However, as 
the model suggests, they need not be contradictory or mutually exclusive. I will 
return to this typology in chapter three by applying it to the European Union.  
1.3 Approach 
Recapturing the questions put forward above, the issue at hand boils down to the 
following: How can we explain the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of 
the European Commission?  
Furthermore, three subordinate questions are put forward:   
a) have the processes been driven forwards by the member states, 
 14 
b) have the processes been driven forwards by the European institutions, 
c)  or should they be viewed as reflections of ideas?  
The latter questions are not taken out of thin air, but are based on assumptions drawn 
from theories on the functioning of the European Union and the study of 
organisations; intergovernmentalism, neo-institutionalism  and organisation theory.  
These perspectives shall be employed as a theoretical framework for the analysis. The 
aim is not to test the theories in themselves, neither is the Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the Commission to be seen as a critical case. The aim is rather 
to let the theories guide the work as I attempt to unravel the explanatory factors of the 
two processes at hand. Therefore, no attempts will be made at creating the most 
elaborate and elegant hypotheses. However, as they both guide the analysis and 
selection of variables and data, it is important to state them explicitly. The data will 
be analysed employing case study research. This is ideal for my study as it enables 
me to employ a number of sources of data on different levels, making it possible to 
shed light on the variables selected. The theoretical and methodological framework 
will be elaborated on in the following chapter.  
1.4 Outline 
The attempt to shed light on the research question will be structured as follows. 
Chapter two will see the construction of the theoretical framework. Two main 
perspectives will be presented and adapted to the research question; first a rational 
perspective based on intergovernmental theory and rational choice institutionalism, 
second an environment based perspective basing itself on organisation theories. 
Furthermore, the methodological framework will be elaborated on, presenting the 
research methods applied. The typology presented above will be applied to the EU in 
chapter three. The Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission and 
its relations with the EP will be traced from the Treaty of Amsterdam through the 
Treaty of Nice showing a strengthening of both presidential and parliamentary traits. 
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Additional remarks will be made on the Reform Treaty. Subsequently this analysis 
will be employed as the dependent variable as I seek to explain these processes.  
The empirical framework of the analysis will be presented in chapter four. Drawing 
on the postulations of the theoretical perspectives, I will seek explanations in the 
intergovernmental conferences (IGC) preceding the signing of the Treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nice as well as the informal adaptations of these. Furthermore, data 
will be collected from the inter-institutional relations between the Commission and 
the EP. Following this, chapter five will combine the theoretical and the empirical 
framework. Three analyses will be presented. The first bases itself on the assumption 
of the member states as rational actors and the Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the Commission is seen as institutional design. The second 
analysis basis itself on the assumption of the European institutions as rational actors 
and Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation is viewed as rational adaptation from 
the institutions. The third and final analysis sheds light on the legitimising effect of 
ideas tracing the two processes to ideas prevalent in the organisational environment. 
Chapter six sees my final remarks and concludes that the processes at hand can better 
be understood by combining the three analytical perspectives.  
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2. Theoretical framework:                                  
Perspectives, hypotheses and methodology 
How can we employ theories to explain the changing nature of the Commission? Few 
perspectives can be easily adapted to explain changes in governmental structures at 
this level, but the study of the European integration has produced a number of 
theories and concepts to draw upon. In the following sections I will adapt these 
theories to the study of Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the 
Commission constructing expectations and hypotheses. This is not to say that I will 
construct a system of hypotheses where the verification of one will automatically 
contradict the other. Neither do I expect to identify all explanatory variables. I want 
to construct a framework to analyse the empirical findings of chapters three and four 
with.  
The theoretical framework will be based on two groups of perspectives. First, a 
rational perspective, making use of intergovernmental theory, rational-choice 
institutionalism and agency theory, putting focus on the strategies of rational actors. 
Second, I will employ an environmental perspective making use of organisation 
theory, emphasising the influence of norms on the level of the organisational 
environment3. By doing so I hope to construct a set of explanatory factors and 
hypotheses that will help clarify the Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation of the 
European Commission.  The chapter will proceed in two parts. First I will present the 
two perspectives and derive expectations and hypotheses from their postulations. 
Second, I will elaborate on the methodological choices made and present the research 
methods chosen for the study.  
                                              
3 The concepts of ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’, as well as ‘reform’ and ‘change’ is often taken to connote different ideas 
in organisational and institutional theory. I’m well aware of this, but as the scope of this thesis is neither to construct the 
more elaborate theoretical framework or to test the theories, thus I will not differentiate between them.  
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2.1 Rational perspectives 
The assumption of rational actors is well established in the study of international 
politics. In this section I will present and develop two sets of theories based on this 
assumption. First, a model based on Stanley Hoffmann’s (1995) intergovernmental 
theory and Andrew Moravcsik’s (1991; 1993; 1998) later interpretation, liberal 
intergovernmentalism, putting focus on the state as a rational actor. Second, a model 
based on rational choice institutionalism and their interpretation of game theory, 
emphasising rational institutions. Though the sets of theories both make use of the 
rationality assumption, as will be shown, they differ quite dramatically on their 
assumptions on actors.  
2.1.1 Intergovernmentalism 
For intergovernmentalists, the rational actors at hand are the states. The theory builds 
on the neo-realist assumption of rational unitary actors. Thus, the member states of 
the European Union are viewed as the primary actors of European integration. They 
form and shape the integration process to their will. As rational actors, the states are 
taken to protect national interests. Unlike classic realism, intergovernmentalists 
recognise that states can and will pursue this through interstate cooperation. 
However, cooperation with other states is only undertaken if it furthers national 
interests. A convergence of preference between member states is therefore a 
prerequisite for cooperation (Hoffman 1995). Furthermore states are not expected to 
give up their sovereignty, but to pool it (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Pollack 
2005).  
Classic intergovernmentalism sees national preferences as a reflection of the states 
perception of its relative position in the state system (Rosamond 2000: 137) As their 
name might suggest, liberal intergovernmentalism incorporate liberal theories of 
preference formation. It is not the relative power of the states that determine their 
interests, but preference formation on the national level. Thus, it is not the externally 
given interests of the larger member states than converge, but the domestic policy 
 18 
preferences (Moravcsik 1991: 48-49) The scope of intergovernmentalism is not to 
explain the day to day policy making of the EU, but to understand its history making 
decisions. Focus is therefore put on Treaty negotiations. “Treaty revisions are 
presented as moments when the course of integration process is debated, decided, 
altered and/or consolidated” (Rosamond 2000: 131). Intergovernmental theory thus 
suggests that we seek explanations for the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation 
of the Commission when and where these are negotiated.  
For intergovernmentalists the results of these negotiations will always reflect the 
relative power of the states involved, favouring the more powerful states. For liberal 
intergovernmentalists, interstate negotiations result in a lowest common denominator 
agreement (Pollack 2005). As the scope of this thesis is not to attribute the changing 
character of the Commission Presidency to single member states, but rather to see if 
the member states, collectively, can be said to be the more important actors in this 
process, it is their assumption of member state primacy that will be applied on the 
empirical findings.  
For the adherents of intergovernmentalism, the European institutions are not 
recognised as actors in the European integration process, but can be viewed as a by-
product of interstate negotiation.  They are set up by rational actors, and are to be 
seen as products of the member states will. They are shaped and given mandates to 
serve the purpose of the member states. They reduce transaction costs and are seen as 
neutral bodies that uphold the agreements (Cini 2007: 102-103).Thus the European 
institutions are viewed as a mechanism for interstate cooperation, and instruments for 
the member states rather than actors in themselves. They are not thought to influence 
their own structure. Explanatory factors need therefore be sought in 
intergovernmental fora such as the European Council. If the institutions develop 
agendas of their own, intergovernmentalists believe the member states will pull out 
(Cini 2007:104).  
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2.1.2 Rational Choice institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism is a part of the multifaceted neo-institutional school 
of thought that had its upsurge in the 80’s and 90’s. The rather diverse perspective is 
based on the assumption that ‘institutions matter’ (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000). 
Unlike in intergovernmental theory, institutions should not only be viewed as neutral 
means for their creators, institutions influence the processes that take place within 
them. Though the different branches of the theory, rational choice institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism, have different perceptions 
of why and how institutions matter, they believe they provide a context for decision 
making (Peters 2005).   
Rational choice institutionalism is less of a coherent theory than the other two. Most 
practitioners share the intergovernmental view of methodological individualism and 
the supposition that cooperation is instrumental in its character (Peters 2005: 19; 
Aspinwall & Schneider 2000: 10-11). “In general, rational choice institutionalism 
sees politics as an arena in which individuals try to maximize their personal 
gain…Rational choice institutionalism consequently sees institutions as providing a 
context within which individual decisions are set, but places the emphasis on 
‘individual’ not context” (ibid.). Furthermore, they share the basic assumption that 
institutions are set up to lower transaction costs related to inter state cooperation 
(ibid.). Institutions are thus viewed as intervening variables. However, as the 
European Union has grown into a complex system of power sharing and delegation, 
rational choice adherents focus on principal-agent relations. It is this relation, an 
imperfect division of power, that enable the institutions to exploit their position and 
seek to gain more power (ibid.: 13).  Thus rational choice institutionalism ‘opens up’ 
the assumptions of intergovernmental theory and grant the European institutions 
influence over their own roles and structures.  
Rational choice institutionalism often makes use of game theory, in particular non-
cooperative game theory, to explain this power play (ibid.). In their work on the co-
decision procedure and the reform of the co-decision procedure, Tsebelis (1994; 
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1996; 2002) and Moser (1996) show how the Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council can be taken to be rational actors, trying to maximise their gain and their 
position through European policy making. By applying these basic assumptions, 
rational choice institutionalism can therefore be used to highlight the changing 
relative power of the institutional actors.4 By employing their assumptions for the 
behaviour of the institutions, maximising their own interests, we can devise 
expectations for the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the European 
Commission. 
2.1.3 Institutional change as rational action 
How can the rational perspective shed light on the Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the European Commission? Two, rather conflicting 
expectations can be derived. One based on the assumption of rational member states, 
the other on the assumption of rational institutions. 
First, following intergovernmental theory, we need to ask the question to what extent 
these two processes have been driven forwards by the member states. When and 
where have the member states taken the decision to reform the Commission? 
According to the intergovernmental perspective, the key to understanding these 
processes are to be found in the intergovernmental conferences. These are the arenas 
where member states meet to negotiate and renegotiate the formal framework for 
interstate cooperation. 
As the member states are taken to be rational actors, institutional change should be 
viewed as a result of institutional design. European institutions are only set up insofar 
as they serve a function for the member states. A change in the structure of the 
Commission should therefore be expected to have a functional explanation.  
                                              
4 Game theorists often construct stylised models for the behaviour of their actors and test these on empirical findings. Due 
to the scope of this thesis, I will only make use of hypotheses when testing this perspective. Furthermore, I am aware that 
rational action may not only be limited to utility maximising behaviour. However, a larger discussion of this goes well 
beyond the scope of the analysis.  
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Reforms initiated will yield effects. Institutions can be expected to act according to 
the formal provisions granted by the member states. It is to be expected that their 
functions and the relation between the European institutions will reflect the Treaty 
framework. Consequently, this can be expected to change if and only if changes are 
made to the Treaties. Following the same line of argument, there will be no 
adaptation of these provisions between intergovernmental conferences, and the 
internal working procedures of the Commission and the working provisions for inter-
institutional agreements are expected to mirror those of the Treaty framework. 
This expectation can also be used on the European institutions role in 
intergovernmental conferences. The institutions are only given a role insofar as it 
serves the interests of the member states. This is not to say that the European 
institutions and the member states don’t have overlapping interests, it just goes to say 
that the institutions are without independent influence.  Furthermore, each 
intergovernmental conference is to be treated as an isolated case of international 
cooperation. The member states may increase the influence of the institutions in one 
negotiation round, and reduce it the next. More importantly, the member states are 
expected to maintain an ‘exit-strategy’. Though they have increased the powers of the 
Commission Presidency, they will retain the power to reduce it.  
The second perspective extends this concept of actors. By drawing on principal-agent 
relations, the European institutions are taken to be actors in themselves, not only 
instruments. Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation should therefore be seen as a 
result of rational behaviour from institutions stretching their mandate.  
Presidentialisation is thus expected to result from the maximising behaviour of the 
Commission President. Parliamentarisation is to be seen as a gradual process where 
the Parliament tries to gain influence for itself as it interacts with the Commission. 
We would therefore expect the two processes to be gradual.  
This assumption of maximising behaviour further extends the assumptions of where 
these processes are initiated. They can not be isolated to Treaty negotiations. As new 
provisions are included in the formal framework, the institutions are expected to 
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adapt these to further strengthen their role. This should be reflected in their own 
working arrangements. The internal working arrangements of the Commission are 
therefore thought to emphasise a strong President within the College. The working 
arrangements of the Parliament are expected to reflect a strong Parliament vis-à-vis 
the Commission. But the arrow of causality may also be reversed. The Commission 
and the European Parliament are expected to use their positions within the 
intergovernmental conferences to extend their mandates.  Furthermore, unlike the 
intergovernmental perspective, rational choice institutionalism does not exclude the 
possibility that the institutions engage in inter-institutional cooperation that go 
beyond those stipulated in the formal framework. We can therefore expect the 
European institutions to push their mandates also in their inter-institutional relations.     
The following hypotheses can therefore be constructed:  
H1: Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission has been 
driven forwards by the member states. The processes have been negotiated in 
intergovernmental conferences and the internal structure of the Commission 
and its relationship with the European Parliament reflect the Treaties.  
H2: The Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission has been 
driven forwards by maximising institutions.  Change in formal structure can not 
be isolated to formal negotiation processes, but may also be caused by 
institutions adapting their roles.  
2.2 An environement based perspective  
The concept of norms is to a lesser extent used in the study of the European 
integration process. The following perspective will therefore draw on the study of 
organisations. It will make use of the works of, amongst others, Meyer and Rowan 
(1977;1991) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983;1991), emphasising the relation 
between an organisation and its environment. By adapting their perspectives I will 
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derive expectations on the role of norms in the Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the Commission.      
2.2.1 Isomorphism and the institutional environment  
The broader normative and cultural environment can be said to be of interest in the 
study of institutions. Not only can institutions be seen to reflect the will of the actors 
initiating them, they may also be viewed as reflections of their organisational or 
institutional environment. Within the organisation’s environment there will be 
expectations of how the organisation should be, referred to as myths (Christensen et 
al. 2004). As organisations adapt to these myths they grow more alike, causing 
isomorphy among them.  
In today’s complex society, organisations may have multiple sources of incompatible 
and inconsistent expectations. Pressure may also vary with sections of the 
organisation. Common to these perceptions of how the organisation should function 
is that they are highly institutionalised in the broader society, that is their value is 
taken for granted, regardless of their actual effect. Furthermore, they are rationalised 
in the sense that they are presented as an efficient means for organisations in a 
scientific way. Moreover, ideas are spread amongst organisations because they are 
immaterial concepts that can be adapted to the organisation in question (ibid.).  I will 
argue that parliamentarism and the idea of a strong president may be viewed as such 
myths.  
Advocates of the environmental perspective claim institutions gain legitimacy by 
incorporating the norms of the broader society. However, they differ on the 
mechanisms that result in an adaptation to the environment. Meyer and Rowan (1977; 
1991) base their argument on the assumption that institutions gain legitimacy by 
reflecting societal values rather than adhering to technical demands. Organisations 
will therefore change as they adapt to society. “…organizations are driven to 
incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts 
of organizational work and institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so 
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increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate 
efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 340).   
The explanation for the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the European 
Commission need therefore be sought in the values of its broader environment.  
DiMaggio and Powell isolate three mechanisms that may cause isomorphy among 
organisations. First, pressure can be exerted by one organisation on the next, coercing 
change in their structure. Second, uncertainty and ambiguity within an organisation 
relating to its goals and functions may cause an organisation to mimic similar 
organisations, thus causing them to grow more alike.  Third, DiMaggio and Powell 
point to the spreading of professions amongst organisations. As these develop and 
expand they bring with them values from one organisation to the next, causing them 
to grow more alike (DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 67-96). Norms consequently gain 
influence over the organisation on an individual level.  
The latter mechanism thus shares some of its assumptions with sociological 
institutionalism (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000), though norms are given an impact on 
the level of the organisation’s environment, not the individual. As data will not be 
collected on this level, this perspective will be left for others to elaborate on. 
Emphasis will be put on Meyer and Rowans thesis and the two former mechanisms of 
DiMaggio and Powell, and focus will be put on the degree the European Council, the 
Commission and the European Parliament employ such myths. As their perspective is 
not an integration theory per se, but is drawn form organisation theory, it has no 
provisions as to which actors are to be considered the more important. Myths are the 
driving force in organisational change.  
Isomorphism theory may also be given a rational interpretation. By focusing on how 
norms or myths may be applied rationally by leadership to increase the efficiency of 
an organisation, myths are interpreted as instruments or means. Within this 
perspective, myths are thought to have a lesser effect than the traditional 
interpretation of the environment. Reforms are used as means to gain legitimacy and 
though they may be implemented, this is only for show and little change come from it 
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(See Røvik 2007; Brunsson 2002). This perspective overlaps with the rational 
perspective presented above, and will be left out of the analysis.  
2.2.2 Institutional change as myth driven processes 
The argument for the applicability of this perspective is a different one than for 
intergovernmentalism and rational choice institutionalism. Its postulations are unlike 
those that base their line of argument on which set of actors are the more influential. 
This perspective presupposes that it is an idea rather than an actor that is in the 
driver’s seat of institutional reform. To understand the changes in the nature of the 
Commission Presidency we therefore need to explore the degree to which myths 
affect the actors in the process. Following this theoretical perspective, these ideas can 
be expected to guide the European actors as they shape and form the European 
institutions, either through the Council and Treaty negotiations, or through the 
adaptation of these by the members of the Commission and the EP. One may also 
expect there to be a multitude of myths and expectations.   
I argue that Parliamentarism can be viewed as such a myth, deeply rooted in the 
political thinking of Europe. To a large extent, one can expect the members of the 
Commission and the members of the European Parliament have previous experience 
from national politics. The members of the European Council can be expected to be 
thoroughly seated within the national political culture. They bring with them a 
perception of self, and a perception of the actors they are to interact with. 
Furthermore, they bring with them a perception of the function of the institutions they 
make up. As parliamentary systems of government are prevalent in the member 
states, the concept of parliamentarism is expected to be strongly institutionalised with 
a meaning. As the EU is a rather novel construction, one might expect it to mirror 
other successful organisations in its environment, such as the nation state. The 
dynamics within the Commission, and its relation to other European institutions, can 
be seen as an attempt to mirror the particular arrangements of the European nation 
states.   
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Presidentialisation may also be viewed as a prevalent myth. Though it can not boast 
of the same historical traditions in Europe, Poguntke and Webb (2005) have pointed 
to a general trend towards a presidentialisation of politics. That is not to say that 
Europe is seeing its number of presidents increase, but they point to a gradual 
strengthening of the chief executive. Basing their study on a range of European 
countries, the U.S and Canada, they show a presidentialisation through “the growth of 
leadership power and autonomy within parties and political executives, and the 
prominence of leaders in the electoral processes” (Poguntke & Webb 2005: 336). As 
this process has driven political systems to become more alike across structural 
differences one might expect it to be part of a trend, or a zeitgeist. As rationalised and 
institutionalised myths they may therefore be expected to influence the functioning of 
the institutions on a European level and the actors working within them. Thus we 
might expect the EU to adopt the same structures.  
The following hypothesis can therefore be constructed:  
H3: The Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission has been 
caused by the European Institutions adapting to the myths of the institutional 
environment; parliamentarism and the idea of a strong President.  
2.3 Critical remarks – and how to fix them 
Can these theories be combined into a theoretical framework? By employing all three 
sets of perspectives I hope to shed light on the process that I would not have been 
able to do by employing them separately. Intergovernmental theory can be criticised 
for focusing merely on the states and thus overlooking the influence the institutions 
may have over the European integration process. By including a hypothesis based on 
rational choice institutionalism I hope to bypass this. The same can be said for neo-
institutional theory. This school of though has been under attack for not paying 
enough attention on the role of the member states. Critics claim that even though the 
institutions are of influence, the member states are more resourceful (Kassim & 
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Menon 2004).  Thus, a combination of the two perspectives might yield more 
information.  
Furthermore, intergovernmental theory can be criticised for only focusing on the 
history making decisions, and overlooking gradual processes of integration. Rational 
choice institutionalism will help me avoid such an outlook by broadening the 
assumptions on the processes of institutional change. It might be said that I’m 
breaking the assumptions of neo-institutional theories by only focusing on formal 
processes.  However, building on research done on treaty changes, these suggest that 
the constitutional framework of the union has evolved through a dynamic relationship 
between formalised and non-formalised practices (Farrell & Heritier 2003).  
However, both rational choice institutionalism and intergovernmental theory make 
the assumption that actors are rational. The former focusing on institutions, the latter 
member states. By including the myth driven perspective I hope to be able to open up 
this rather limited assumption. However, the environmental perspective may be 
criticised for not being able to pinpoint which organisational structures are adapted to 
mirror demands in the broader society and what mechanisms drive forwards such a 
process. By searching for arguments based on this perspective in the formal processes 
surrounding the Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation of the Commission I hope 
to avoid this.  
A challenge when combining these perspectives to shed light on one case is that they 
make use of different levels of variables and units of analysis. Intergovernmental 
studies focus on intergovernmental conferences and state behaviour. Rational-choice 
institutionalism makes use of formal models often in a short term perspective. 
Sociological institutionalism more often makes use of qualitative, long term analyses 
(Aspinwall &Schneider 2000:7). Institutional isomorphy bases its analysis on an 
entirely different level (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  However, as I will return to in 
the following section, I will employ a research strategy that allows me to employ all 
three perspectives.  
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2.4 Research methodology and data 
How will the theoretical framework be employed? In the following I will present the 
methodological framework, elaborating on case studies as well as the selection of 
data that has been made. Finally, remarks will be made on the reliability and validity 
of my research.    
2.4.1 Theories as an interpretive and explanatory framework: case 
studies 
Case study research is the dominant empirical research strategy for the study of the 
EU (Andersen 2003: 6). It is said to be ideal for complex social phenomena where the 
aim is to “retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 
2003: 2). Case studies as such can be undertaken in a number of ways. I have chosen 
to treat the two processes presented in chapter one as a single case, and in my 
analysis I seek to explain them as such. It could have been broken down into multiple 
case studies by treating each indicator as a separate case. Furthermore, by focusing on 
their differences and commonalities, the study could have been comparative. 
However, as I hold them to be one process, I have chosen to conduct a single case 
study. On the other hand, separate marks will be made in the analysis.  
There are a number of problems connected with case studies. Mainly, the problem 
lies with the small number of units that are being analysed, and that one therefore 
runs the risk of not being able to generalise from one study to others. Though case 
studies may not be generalisable to populations of units, they may be generalisable to 
theoretical concepts (ibid.:10). In my analysis I shall make use of theories as an 
interpretive and explanatory framework. “The ambition is to apply theory, develop 
empirical implications and construct explanations” (Andersen 2003: 10). I realise 
that my explanatory factors will be highly dependent on the assumptions the selected 
theories are based on, biasing the data. By comparing the theoretical framework to 
the empirical findings, I hope to broaden our understanding of the phenomenon in 
particular. Though my goal is not to generalise, I hope the study will increase our 
 29
understanding of the interplay of the institutions in general. I am aware of the 
limitation of case studies and generalisation as compared to more quantitatively 
oriented studies, but due to the nature of my research topic, I view the chosen strategy 
as more suitable. 
The data gathered will be analysed using qualitative document analysis. With a 
research topic such as this I argue that this is the better option. I seek to trace broad 
trends, and arguments used for the strengthening of these. With quantitative 
document analysis we risk loosing information. I will return to the data sources in the 
following section.  
As mentioned above, the scope of this thesis is to understand the processes that have 
caused the strengthening of the Presidency within the Commission at the same time 
as the Commission in itself has become more dependent on the will of the Parliament. 
The time-span of the analysis stretches over a decade. Little research has been done 
on this before, and this thesis will therefore broaden our understanding of this 
process. The study will not yield any information on the individual level. It will not 
give us any information on the informal processes within the institutions, neither will 
it be able to break down the member states and shed light on coalitions within the 
European Council. However, I believe it will increase the knowledge of the processes 
surrounding these changes, and the results can therefore lay the foundations for 
further, more in depth analysis.  
2.4.2 Selection of data 
Case study-methodology enables me to make use of data from a number of sources to 
highlight my research topic (Yin 2003: 83). As seen, the theories presented above 
employ different assumption and therefore utilise different data sources. By 
employing a case study strategy I can therefore make use of data that can shed light 
on all three perspectives.  
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The EU has made a broad range of documents available for analysis.  The changes 
that I seek to explain can be found in the Treaties themselves, the Rules of Procedures 
of the institutions and inter-institutional framework agreements. Following efforts of 
making European decision making more accessible to its citizens most of these 
documents are available through the Europa web portal and/or in the Official Journal 
of the European Union. The Council Regulation governing this only dates back to 
2001. Documents pre-dating this has either been published online regardless or been 
made available to me.  
Data concerning Treaty negotiations and the intergovernmental conferences set up to 
deliberate these are also readily available online. This enables me to review the 
documents produced during the IGCs, covering both the opinions of the European 
institutions as well as the opinions of the member states through the Council 
Presidency conclusions.  However, little data is available from the later phases of the 
IGC. As the European leaders meet to deliberate and negotiate the final texts, little 
information is made public except for the final results. As I seek to explain the role of 
the IGCs and the member states as compared to a gradual change driven forwards as 
the European institutions adapt to these rules, this information is not vital to my 
research. Though it will not yield any information as to which country sought further 
Presidentialisation and/or Parliamentarisation of the Commission, a comparison of 
the final results and the positions of the EP and the Commission, will help answer my 
research questions.  
I will also make use of secondary literature. A broad range of studies have been done 
on the Commission, its relationship with the European Parliament and Treaty 
negotiations. By reviewing these, I can draw on their results in my effort to shed light 
on my research question. This is especially the case for the nomination and election 
procedures where less data has been made available. Research on Treaty negotiations 
has also helped me select the documents for further analyses.  
I have chosen not to undergo interviews. Interviews could have given me information 
on the individual level, as well as clarification on informal processes. However, the 
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time frame of this analysis is rather broad, and reliable data based on interviews 
would have entailed a large number of interviews on several levels and in multiple 
organisations. Furthermore, as some of the events being analysed took place more 
than ten years ago, questions could be raised as to their reliability.  
2.4.3 Applying the theoretical framework: Reliability and validity 
Two concepts are important for the quality of case studies, reliability and validity. 
Reliability measures the degree to which the operations of the study can be repeated 
with the same results. The validity of the study5 measures the degree to which the 
operational measures reflect the concepts being studied (Yin 2003: 34).  
As shown above, I have chosen to make use of mostly official EU documents to shed 
light on the Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation of the Commission. Official 
documents can expect to hold a high degree of reliability when used as data. They 
can be taken to be less biased than other sources, and random errors are expected to 
be corrected over time. The chances for biased sources of data to corrupt the analysis 
are further reduced by employing data from a number of different sources.  I 
therefore believe my analysis will hold a high degree of reliability. Additional 
secondary sources of data have also been collected. Multiple sources of data enable 
triangulation which further strengthens the reliability of the study. The majority of the 
data sources are easily available via the Europa web portal. Furthermore, the data I 
employ is presented in chapter four. The data is therefore easily available for others 
wishing to repeat the analysis.  
As for the validity I believe the data sources are well adept to elucidate the 
functioning of the European institutions. I believe the main concepts of this thesis, 
Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation are well elaborated on. This is done both 
                                              
5 The measurement of validity presented above is referred to as concept validity. Other interpretations of validity are the 
internal validity, referring to the internal causality of the arguments, and external validity referring to the domain for which 
the results of the study can be generalised (Yin 2003: 34). These two concepts of validity are let out of my study as they are 
not relevant.  
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with the typology presented in the introduction, and in chapter three, where this is 
used to explain recent tendencies in within the Commission and its relations to the 
EP. I employ a formal perspective on the strengthening of the Commission 
Presidency and the Commission’s growing dependence on the will of the Parliament, 
basing the concepts on the Treaty framework.  
As shown above, the data employed also reflect a formal interpretation. The data used 
is collected from processes where the formal arrangements are renegotiated and 
employed, basing the data on intergovernmental conferences, Treaties, Rules of 
Procedure (RoP) and inter-institutional agreements, guard the functioning of the 
Union. A comment should be added. As the formal interpretation is applied, it is 
difficult to isolate the effect of the Commission Presidency. In these formal forums 
the President represents the Commission as a whole, and the documents presented by 
the Commission is put forwards by the College as a whole. However, I argue that 
they are a good indicator for the Presidency’s standing within the College. I therefore 
believe the validity of the study to be strong. A small caveat should be included. 
Though legal documents are being used, this is not a legal study. Focus will not be on 
their legal status, but to what degree they support the Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the Commission. They might not shed light on the more 
informal procedures that might evolve, but never be formalised. The methods I have 
chosen to employ and the data I will collect will not yield any information on this. 




3. Typology applied: The European Commission 
between Parliamentarisation and 
Presidentialisation             
How can the Parliamentarisation/Presidentialisation typology be applied on the 
Commission? To what extent is the European Commission moving towards the two 
ideal models? Using the framework set up in the introduction, this section will 
present an elaboration of the dependent variable tracing the pattern of reform from 
Amsterdam to Nice. As mentioned in the introduction, the nomination of the Barroso 
Commission introduced a new practice. This appears in the Reform Treaty and short 
remarks will remarks will also be made on the reforms that will appear if the Treaty is 
ratified in its current form.  
The institutional workings of the European Union is a disputed issue, in particular 
those with supranational characteristics. The past decades have seen a rapid increase 
of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) and Treaties. Unlike its member states, the 
EU has seen an almost continuous process of Treaty revisions. As one IGC draws to 
an end, provisions are added for a new conference reviewing the Treaties (Treaty on 
European Union 1992; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; Treaty of Nice 2001). As 
European integration has widened in its scope and broadened in its borders, so has the 
intensity of the IGCs grown, adapting the institutions to new challenges.  Throughout 
these, I argue, one can trace the strengthening of the presidential prerogatives and the 
growing influence of the EP over the Commission.  
The presentation will be done in four parts. The first three concerning themselves 
with the Treaties in question, the fourth an application of the typology.  
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3.1 Amsterdam: formalising hierarchy  
Little reference was made to the role of the President of the Commission prior to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). How did the presidential prerogatives advance with 
these Treaty negotiations? Two amendments are worth mentioning. First the ToA 
formalised a new internal balance of the Commission “The Commission shall work 
under the political guidance of its President” (ibid.: Article 219). This left the 
Presidency with strengthened leadership resources as it opened up possibilities for 
political, rather than administrative leadership of the work of the Commission. The 
President’s ability to lead and influence the work of the Commission was further 
increased as the presidential prerogatives for allocation of tasks within the 
Commission were formalised. “… the President of the Commission must enjoy broad 
discretion in the allocation of tasks within the College, as well as in any reshuffling 
of those tasks during a Commissions term of office” (ibid.: Declaration 32 attached to 
the final act, 2nd sub-paragraph). Thus the Presidency gained in influence over the 
Commission, obtaining the power to shape its composition and through it, its policies, 
without the involvement of member states, significantly strengthening the hierarchy 
of the institution.  This may therefore be viewed as one of the more important 
reforms. 
Second, changes were made to the nomination of the President and the Commission. 
With Amsterdam, the EP was formally given the power of assent in the appointment 
of the Commission President, separating it from the nomination of the Commission as 
a whole. “The governments of the Member States shall nominate by common accord 
the person they intend to appoint as President of the Commission; the nomination 
shall be approved by the European Parliament” (ibid.: Article 214 (2) 2nd sub-
paragraph). The EP thus increased its influence over the Commission President and 
the balance between the bodies was altered.  
The President-elect position in the nomination procedure was also strengthened, 
furthering the new internal balance of the Commission. “The governments of the 
Member States shall, by common accord with the nominee for President, nominate 
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the other persons whom they intend to appoint as Members of the Commission” 
(ibid.; Falkner and Nentwhich 2000: 22-24). However, it is still the prerogative of the 
member states to put forwards national candidates for such a nomination, successfully 
limiting the influences of the President-elect. I will return to this point in the 
following chapters.   
Some collegial traits were still kept. The President of the Commission and the 
Commission as a whole were made dependent on the EP by a positive vote to take 
office.” The President and the other Members of the Commission thus nominated 
shall be subject as a body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament. After 
approval by the European Parliament, the President and the other Members of the 
Commission shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member 
States” (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997: Article 214 (2) 2nd sub-paragraph). Thus, even if 
the Parliament’s influence over the President grew, the college could still only be 
held responsible as a body and the Parliament’s influence over the other 
Commissioners were therefore limited.  
3.2 Nice: reinforcing hierarchy 
The special nature of the President continued to be emphasised with the Treaty of 
Nice (2001). The Presidency’s influences over the organisation of the Commission 
increased. “The Commission shall work under the political guidance of its President, 
who shall decide on its internal organisation in order to ensure it acts consistent, 
efficiently and on the basis of collegiality” (ibid.: Article 217 (1). This might be seen 
as opening up for a stronger internal leadership by the presidency, yet at the same 
time, it puts focus on the collegial nature of the Commission.   
What is more, the President’s influence over the workings of the Commission was 
reinforced as the Treaty formalised the informal agreement initiated by the Prodi 
Commission that any member of the Commission would resign upon the request of 
the President “A member of the Commission shall resign if the President so requests, 
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after obtaining the approval of the College” (ibid. (4), Spence 2000: 6). Thus the 
formal power to remove a Commissioner was obtained, increasing the leadership 
resources of the Presidency. Consequently it can also be seen to strengthen the 
Commissions standing as a whole as incompetent members may be asked to leave 
without the whole College having to step down. However, should such a resignation 
take place, the President was left without influence in the process of naming the 
replacement, effectively limiting the use of such a mechanism (ibid.: Article 215). 
Furthermore, an over-powerful President will be limited by his need to seek approval 
from the College.  
The influence of the Parliament over the Commission in the nomination procedure, 
remained the same with Nice. However, the European Council would now nominate 
the President using qualified majority voting “The council, meeting in the 
composition of Heads of State or Government  and acting by a qualified majority, 
shall nominate the person it intends to appoint as President of the Commission; the 
nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament” (ibid.: Article 214 (2) 1st  
paragraph).  The member states thus lost their veto, and one might expect that the 
willingness to compromise will increase (Neuhold 2006: 358). The role of the EP 
remained the same, but it might be argued that the balance between Council and the 
EP changed. As it stands today, the Treaty of Nice still govern the functioning of the 
Union. 
3.3 Towards a constitutional moment?  
The draft Reform Treaty tabled in July 2007 (European Council 2007) continues the 
Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission. A member of the 
Commission shall resign upon the wishes of the President, but the formal consultation 
is removed of the Commissioners, thus strengthening the independent role of the 
President (ibid.: Title III, article 9d - 7 (c). More interestingly, the Treaty provides for 
the involvement of the President in appointing a replacement. Though the member 
states retain the power to take part in this decision, and the EP is to be consulted, it 
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significantly increases the Presidents ability of using this in shaping the Commission 
(ibid.:Art 215 2nd paragraph). However, whether or not this will be put into place, 
remains to be seen.  
If ratified in its current shape, the Reform Treaty, will bring the relationship between 
the EP and the Commission closer to a parliamentary system. Building on the 
provisions of earlier treaties, the Reform Treaty  establishes a chain of responsibility 
between the EP and the Commission.  “The Commission, as a body, shall be 
responsible to the European Parliament” (ibid.: Title III, article 9d -6). Not only will 
the Commission be held accountable, but it will also, in part, emerge from the EP, 
furthering the parliamentary traits. “Taking into account the elections to the 
European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the 
European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European 
Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. The candidate shall be 
elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members” 
(ibid.:Title III, article 9d -8) As the Barroso Commission nomination and investiture 
processes showed, some of these provisions have been put into use, prior to its 
ratification (Beukers 2006). This yields a number of questions. Leaving answering 
these to the analysis, I now return to the key concepts. 
3.4 In sum: Presidentialisation and Parlamentarisation 
Reforms and changes within the Commission are often analysed with regards to a 
triangle of partially incompatible principles; first, the principal of a strong President, 
second, the principal of collegiality, and third, the principal of the Commissioner 
responsible of his or her dossier (Wessels 2005). The aforementioned Treaties can be 
said to have skewed this balance in favour of the President. Returning to the typology 
of Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation presented in the introduction, I will 
assess these processes of change.  
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Presidentialisation was linked to increasing leadership resources and leadership-
centred elections. Parliamentarisation was seen as a growing responsibility of the 
executive towards the legislature, and increasing influence by the legislature over the 
over the composition of the executive. As seen, one does not exclude the other, and 
both processes can be said to be present within the institutional set-up of the 
European Union.   
A Presidential system of governance can be said to be on the increase. Recent Treaty 
revisions have strengthened the Presidency’s hold on the Commission. Formally it 
has been established that the Commission shall work under the political guidance of 
its President. Furthermore, the Presidency’s ability to exert leadership has been 
reinforced by a presidential prerogative to allocate and reallocate task within the 
Commission. Moreover, he may also ask a member of the Commission to leave. 
These trends all contribute to reinforce the hierarchical structure of the Commission. 
The nomination and election of a new Commission has also come to be more 
leadership oriented. The European Council now nominate the President in a separate 
process and the President-elect is subsequently involved in the nomination of the 
College of Commissioners.   
At the same time the Treaties have strengthened the parliamentary traits of the EU 
institutional framework. The long time established right of censure has been given 
further weight as the Commission to an increasing degree is  held responsible towards 
the EP. First and foremost this has been shown trough the nomination and election 
processes. Not only does the Commission need a positive vote from the EP to take 
power, the President-elect emerged from the majority of the EP, making it dependent 
on EP elections. Thus it can be said that the EU is left with a combination of the two 
ideal models. Both the Commission President and the Parliament have seen their 
positions strengthened in the formal framework. The institutional set-up can be seen 
in Figure 2.  
Is this the end? For it to become more presidential, a more direct election of the 
President must take place. Furthermore, though we can see that the political 
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programme of 
the President has 
become increasingly important, he is still 
not politically responsible to the people 
in a traditional way. More importantly, 
the collegiality seems to be highly valued 
within the EU. Though the Parliament 
has seen its roles increase, it is far from 
the ideal type. Though the Parliament has 
increased its influences over the 
nomination process, the two structures 
are still very much separate. If the 
Commission can be said to emerge from 
the legislature, it is still a dual 
legislature.  
Figure 2: Presidential and Parliamentary traits in the EU 
These processes raise a number of 
questions. How did these structures evolve? Who can be said to be driving them 
forwards and why is it being done? I will return to this in the following chapter 
mapping out the processes that have strengthened the parliamentary and presidential 










4. Negotiations and nominations. 
Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation from 
Amsterdam to Barroso  
In this chapter I will trace the strengthening of the Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the Commission. As seen in chapter three, the Treaties are a 
good indicator for the two processes; however, they do not explain the processes in 
question.  To move towards a deeper understanding of these I have chosen three 
levels of empirical findings. First, as the Treaties govern the EU and set out the main 
guidelines for its work, I view the intergovernmental conferences (IGC) as natural 
sources of explanations. Following the postulations of the theoretical framework 
focus will be on the input of the European Commission and the European Parliament.  
Second, the changes I have mapped out might be driven forwards by the relationship 
between the Commission and the Parliament. I therefore review the Parliament’s 
adaptations of the Treaties through their Rules of Procedure and the inter-institutional 
agreements set up between the Commission and the Parliament to see if changes can 
be traced. Furthermore, I assess the ‘three-party’ process of putting together the Prodi 
and Barroso Commissions6, tracing the roles of the Parliament, the Council and the 
President-designates.  
Finally, I review the internal reforms of the Commission in an attempt to trace the 
processes. The Rules of Procedure are included to shed light on how the Commission 
adapt to the formal Treaty framework. In what way can the Commission President be 
said to lay the political direction of the work? By reviewing these three levels of 
                                              
6 As seen in the introduction, the main aim of this analysis is to shed light on the increase in presidential and parliamentary 
prerogatives with the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. Furthermore, as seen in chapter two, I have chosen a formal approach 
on the collection of data. Though we can not exclude the possibility of the resignation of the Santer Commission affecting 
these proceedings, this will be kept out as it reflects on the already established prerogative of a parliamentary vote of 
censure. Furthermore, as I will show, the institutional revision following the Santer College resignation was to a large 
extend undertaken in the  Nice negotiation round and is therefore included.  
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empirical findings I believe I will be able to trace processes influencing the 
Presidentialisation and the Parliamentarisation of the Commission.   
4.1 Aquis Conferencielle: change as intergovernmental 
negotiations  
Treaty negotiations have been said to be an institution in themselves, where a set of 
actors operate under their own norms and rules , sometimes referred to as the “aquis  
conferencielle” (Beach & Mazzucelli 2007:4: Christiansen 2002; Christiansen & 
Gray 2003). The key actors in negotiating treaties are the member states and their 
representatives (Nugent 2003: 93). “The government of any Member State or the 
Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties 
on which the Union is founded… The amendments shall enter into force after being 
ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements” (Treaty on European Union 1992 Article 48 (ex Article N) Given their 
intergovernmental character, treaties need to be signed and ratified by all member 
states in order to come into force (Sverdrup 2000:241).  
There are no formal provisions for either the agenda setting phase of the conduction 
of intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) within the EU (Beach 2005: 8, Beach & 
Mazzucelli 2007: 3). The agenda of for the Amsterdam negotiations  was prepared by 
a Reflection Group with representatives from the member states, the Commission, the 
EP and the Council Secretariat (Beach 2005: 115). For the Treaty of Nice, the story 
was different. The Santer Commission resignation sped up the Nice negotiations 
(Dinan 2000:40).  No preparatory group was set up, but informal negotiations were 
held at the COREPER level (Committee of Permanent representatives) and at the 
Council of Ministers level (Beach 2005: 146).  
Since the 1985 negotiations, IGCs have had four phases or levels. First, groups of 
national experts are set up, discussing key issues. These are further negotiated on a 
second level by what is called the ‘personal representatives of the minister’ or 
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preparatory groups. Third, the processes are overseen by foreign ministers delivering 
inputs. Fourth, and finally, a European Council is held negotiating outstanding issues 
(Nugent 2003: 96-97; Beach & Mazzucelli 2007: 5).  
Despite its intergovernmental character, European institutions are not without 
influence. The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers provides the IGC with 
its secretariat7. Its function is closely linked to the Council Presidency. By chairing 
the IGC the Presidency plays a special role in moving the rounds forward and setting 
the pace of the negotiations (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 1997: 135-150; Christiansen 
2002: 35; Nugent 2003: 97; Beach 2005: 9). The Commission may both make 
proposals and suggestions for the IGCs, and it functions as a broker during 
negotiations (Nugent 2003: 97). Moreover, as Christensen and Gray have pointed out, 
the Commission, together with the Council Secretariat, are the only European 
institutions entitled to be present in the negotiation room (2003: 15).  Though the 
Parliament is less of an actor during negotiations, it has seen its powers increase, also 
in this field. To a greater extent it has been given the opportunity to participate in 
preparatory groups, and may also submit opinions (ibid.: 98). I will return to this in 
the following presentations.  
4.1.1 Negotiating the Treaty of Amsterdam 
As seen in section two, the Treaty of Amsterdam increased the formal powers of the 
President and strengthened the investiture process in favour of the Parliament. How 
can these changes be traced through the Treaty negotiations?  
For the preparation of the IGC agenda a Reflection Group was established with 
representatives from the member states, the Commission and the European 
Parliament. The group was set up at the Corfu Summit June 1994, and convened a 
                                              
7 Though it is a part of the Council infrastructure, and intergovernmental part of the EU cooperation, the Council secretariat 
is often thought of as an institution in its own, somewhat separate from the Council. See for example Christiansen 2002, or  
Beach 2005. Though I do not hold them to be without influence in the Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation of the 
Commission, this thesis does not allow for a discussion of their role. For that it falls short.   
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year later. The preparatory group was made up by representatives from the member 
states, the Commission and the EP.  Their mandate was to “examine and elaborate 
ideas relating to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union (European Council 
1994). It was not to negotiate between its members, but to draw up an agenda and 
identify issues for further negotiation (Dinan 2005: 163-164). The group presented 
their report at the Madrid Council in December 95. Following its mandate it included 
little but the viewpoints of its members. They identified three main topics for the 
upcoming IGC: making the EU more relevant for its citizens, improving the Unions 
efficiency and accountability and improving the EU’s ability to act internationally 
(Reflection Group 1995). 
On the size and function of the Commission, the members of the Reflection Group 
were partly in agreement. They could agree on its main functions, and its dependence 
on an approval by the Parliament to take office, but could not agree on its 
composition “Broadly, one view within the Group is to retain the present system for 
the future, reinforcing its collegiality and consistency as required. This option would 
allow all members to have at least one Commissioner. Another view is to ensure that 
greater collegiality and consistency be attained by reducing the Commissioners to a 
lesser number than Member States and enhancing their independence” (ibid.). The 
report from the Reflection Group did not mention the special nature of the 
Commission President. The conclusions of the preparatory group were largely kept in 
the conclusions of the Spanish Presidency. The Madrid Council also set a timeframe 
for the IGC indicating that it would finish June 1997 during the Dutch Presidency 
(European Council 1995).  
The negotiations of the ToA marked a significant increase in the Parliament’s role in 
treaty negotiations (Maurer 2002). Not only were they given two representatives in 
the preparatory group, but a system of informal consultations during the IGC was set 
up. They thus gained the power of putting forwards their views and being informed 
of the work undertaken by the member states. However, as the negotiations began, 
they were successfully excluded (Beach 2005: 136). 
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The Parliament published a report on the functioning of the Union as the Reflection 
Group took up its work. The report called for a “greater presidentialization” of the 
working methods within the Commission without going further into detail. A more 
specific demand was made for the strengthening of the parliamentary traits of the 
Union. By suggesting a direct election of future Commission Presidents by the 
Parliament based on a list of candidates presented by the European Council it sought 
to strengthen its role in the investiture process. Furthermore, the Parliament asked for 
the prerogative to request the compulsory retirement of an individual Commissioner, 
thus making the Commission more dependent on the will of the Parliament 
(European Parliament 1995).  
As seen above, neither suggestion was incorporated in the final report made by the 
Reflection Group. As the Parliament presented their opinion to the IGC, this was 
taken note of “Not enough attention has been given by the Reflection Group to the 
system of appointing the Commission. This has to be reformed so that the President 
of the Commission is directly elected by the Parliament on the basis of names 
provided by the European Council” (European Parliament 1996). In a letter to the 
representatives of the member states to the IGC, the EP’s representatives to the 
Reflection group elaborated on their stance asking for the President to be granted the 
formal power to allocate portfolios, but also to reshuffle these and to ask a 
Commissioner to leave (European Parliament 1997a). No mention was made of the 
compulsory retirement of Commissioners. However, as was mentioned in their initial 
report on the results of the IGC, the Parliament vote of approval of the Commission 
President upon the nomination by Council was incorporated in the Treaty following 
established practice. On the other hand this was far from the influence the EP wanted 
to obtain (European Parliament 1997b).  
Like the Parliament, the Commission published an initial response to the Corfu 
European Council. Similar to the EP, it made comments on the functioning of the 
Treaty. Though positive towards a parliamentary vote of assent on the President due 
to its legitimising effects, the Commission was less inclined to continue the 
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individual hearings of nominees for the posts of Commissioners (European 
Commission 1995). The Commission delivered its official opinion on the IGC 
February 1996 making a clear statement of their views of an institutional reform “The 
Commission considers that its President should be designated by the European 
Council and approved by Parliament. The President should play a decisive part in 
the choice of the Commission’s Members, the better to ensure collegiality. In this 
regard, its members should be designated by common agreement between the 
President and the respective governments of the Member States” (European 
Commission 1996). 
As mentioned, the Commission has a greater role to play than the Parliament once the 
IGC has been opened. During this phase the Commission presented the member state 
representatives with specific opinions on the topic at hand. One of them was on the 
functioning of the Commission. Doing so, they continued their emphasis on 
collegiality “The Commission is and must always be collectively accountable to 
Parliament. Individual censure motions should be ruled out as they would destroy the 
collegiality that characterizes the Commission” (European Commission 1997). The 
Commission’s arguments for the strengthening of their President were largely 
functional in their nature. A strengthening of the Presidential prerogatives in the 
nomination of Commissioner would “enable the President to aim equilibrium, 
balance between Members and their respective portfolios and tasks and balanced 
representation of men and women” (ibid.). The Commission also sought for the 
process of reshuffling tasks and portfolios to be made an internal process to the 
Commission making it the responsibility of the President who would refer it to the 
full Commission for a decision (ibid.). 
The IGC was officially convened in as the European leaders met in Turin, Italy. The 
themes of the IGC were to be as laid down by the Reflection Group:  making the EU 
more relevant for its citizens, improving the Unions efficiency and accountability and 
improving the EU’s ability to act internationally. The agenda was deliberated at 
informal ministerial meetings and issue specific meetings were held before the state 
leaders formally convened again in Florence.  The Florence European Council made 
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progress on many issues, but not institutional matters (Beach 2005: 117). This can be 
seen in the conclusions made by the Italian Presidency. Among the issues still in need 
of deliberation was the “the manner of appointing it (the Commission) and its 
composition” (European Council 1996a).  A progress report was put forwards but its 
conclusions were those of the Reflection Group, merely pointing out the different 
options (Europen Council 1996b). Thus, the Florence Summit gave the upcoming 
Irish Presidency the mandate to draw up a draft treaty (European Council 1996a).  
The Irish Presidency presented general introductory notes in an attempt to make 
general positions into precise legal texts. A Draft Treaty was presented to the IGC 
December 1996 (Beach 2005: 117-118). Though progress was made on parts of the 
agenda of the IGC, little was achieved on the subject of institutional reform. In the 
case of the Commission, there seemed to be an agreement on the need to strengthen 
its Presidency, but not on how to solve it. “There is a wide measure of agreement on 
strengthening the powers of the President of the Commission to make the 
Commission more effective. Some would be willing to contemplate giving the 
President authority, under some arrangement to be determined, both to select, and 
perhaps to dismiss, individual Commissioners in certain circumstances as well as an 
explicit right to allocate and re-shuffle portfolios”(European Council 1996c). During 
the Irish Presidency it became clear that this would not be solved till the final 
negotiation took place in Amsterdam (Beach 2005: 119).  
As the Dutch government took on the Presidency of the Council, the focus was put on 
the Irish ‘left-overs’, producing an addendum to the Irish Draft Treaty. However, like 
the previous draft, this was only an identification of problem areas, not a draft 
agreement (Langendoen &Pijpers 2002:280). An informal Summit was held debating 
an informal draft tabled by the Dutch. This did not yield any results on institutional 
issues and the topic was finally cleared the night before the final Treaty was 
presented (Beach 2005: 119-120). The results were seen in chapter three..  
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4.1.2 Negotiating the Treaty of Nice 
As see in chapter three, the Treaty of Nice introduced the President’s power to 
dismiss Commissioner. Together with the power of allocation, this prerogative 
strengthens the Presidents influence over the policies of the Commission. How did 
the negotiation round develop?  
The negotiation of the Treaty of Nice followed a different pattern than that of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, and the agenda evolved in less than a linear fashion. There was 
no preparatory group set up to prepare the IGC. Rather, the agenda setting phase was 
undertaken in COREPER and in the Council of Ministers (Gray & Stubb 2001:8). 
The Cologne European Council in June 1999 marked the beginning of the IGC. 
During the Summit the European leaders drew up a rather limited agenda for the 
conference, focusing on the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting 
of votes in the Council and the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the 
Council. Furthermore, the European leaders also gave the upcoming Finnish 
Presidency the mandate to draw up a report seeking solutions to these institutional 
issues, consulting the member states and the Commission and the EP (European 
Council 1999a).  
As Finland took over the Presidency of the Council only the size and composition of 
the Commission was on the agenda. After consulting the member states, the 
Parliament and the Commission, the Finnish included the possibility of formalizing 
the accountability of individual Commissioners to the President of the Commission 
through an agreement to resign upon the wish of the President (European Council 
1999b) They presented their report to the Helsinki European Council. Though the 
conclusions from the Summit were for the IGC to keep to the aforementioned topics, 
the Presidency Conclusions opened for en extension of the agenda by the incoming 
Portuguese Presidency. Following the participation of the EP in the ToA negotiation 
round, the Helsinki Council emphasised the continued inclusion of the EP in the 
preparation of the IGC (European Council 1999c; Wessels 2001).  
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Both the Parliament and the Commission gave their official opinion before the IGC 
was formally opened (Beach 2005: 147). The Parliament’s initial report only called 
for an extension of the agenda of the IGC, stating that it would give its priorities in a 
subsequent report (European Parliament 2000a).  In the following report, the 
European Parliament set out two future possibilities for the size and composition of 
the Commission, one being a reduced Commission, and the other a Commission 
where the member states get to keep one Commissioner each. However, the latter 
option was made dependent on a strengthening of the President. The Parliament also 
sought to make the Commission more dependent on their approval. It recommitted to 
its claim from the previous IGC that the Parliament should elect the President of the 
Commission amongst candidates put forwards by the Council. The Commission 
should be invested by the Parliament and the Parliament should assess the merits of 
the proposed Commissioners by hearings. Furthermore, the EP wanted the President 
of the Commission to be able to ask for a vote of confidence for his Commission in 
the Parliament. As was mentioned in the report by the Finnish Presidency, the EP 
sought for the formalisation of the resignation of a Commissioner found guilty of 
misconduct on the basis of a request by the President of the Commission. It also 
asked to be given the privilege of the Court of Justice to ask for the resignation of a 
Commissioner to be extended to the Parliament (European Parliament 2000b). 
The newly appointed President of the Commission Romano Prodi had an expert 
group set up to “identify institutional problems which needed to be tackled and to 
present arguments indicating why they needed to be dealt with by the IGC”( Dehaene 
et al 1999; Gray & Stubb 2001: 9). The group, coined ‘the group of wise men’ 
presented their report to the Commission during the Finnish Presidency. For the 
Commission to remain an efficient body after enlargement, the group of wise men 
recommended a strengthening of its Presidency. It envisioned a President with “a 
more effective influence in the nomination and selection of Commissioners. He 
should be given clear authority to organise, co-ordinate and guide the working of the 
institution” (Dehaene et al 1999). The group also advised the formalisation of the 
informal agreement between President Prodi and his Commissioners.  
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The Commission made it clear to the members of the Union in a report to the 
Helsinki European Council that it wanted the upcoming IGC to focus on all 
institutional reforms needed to enable enlargement, thus asking for a broader agenda. 
“How can we assume that it will be easier, with almost thirty Member States, to 
achieve something we were unable to achieve with fifteen at Amsterdam, or that we 
are unwilling to tackle with fifteen today?” (European Commission 1999a). In their 
official opinion to the IGC titled “Adapting the Institutions to make a success of 
enlargement” (European Commission 2000a), the Commission gave their view on 
institutional reform. Like the European Parliament, the Commission sought for the 
formalisation of the agreement set up by Prodi and the Commissioners that the 
individual Commissioners would resign if asked to by the President. Reform of the 
Commissions composition was linked to its unique role in the institutional set-up, its 
principle of collective responsibility and legitimacy. Of the two main options, a 
Commission with less than one Commissioner per member state, and a Commission 
with one representative per state, the Commission preferred the latter owing it to its 
legitimising effect. However, such a solution would require a reform of the 
Commissions operation to ensure its ability to operate efficiently (European 
Commission 2000a).  
The IGC was officially convened in February 2000 during the Portuguese Presidency. 
The Portuguese Presidency attempted to expand the agenda beyond the issues set at 
Helsinki (Beach 2005: 147; Martens 2006). In a report made to the Feira European 
Council the Presidency proposed an agenda going beyond what had been set before, 
outlining the position of the member states and proposing possible treaty changes 
(Gray & Stubb 2001:10, European Council 2000a) Again, the role and composition 
of the Commission was debated, “there is a general consensus that in an enlarged 
Union there will be a need to maintain and build upon the Commission's legitimacy 
and efficiency and its credibility in the eyes of the public, although opinions vary as 
to how to achieve these ends” (European Council 2000a).  As with previous treaty 
rounds, a reduction of the number of Commissioners was seen as a remedy. The Feira 
report offered no solution to this, but mapped out the different positions of the 
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member states. A closely linked issue was the internal organisation of the 
Commission. Though the former topic yielded large differences between the member 
states, there was a greater willingness to increase the powers of the President by 
giving him greater powers in directing the general policies of the Commission and 
vis-à-vis the other Commissioners. On the accountability of the Commission the 
member states debated an individual versus a collective accountability of the 
Commission. Though most member states were positive towards the agreement set up 
between Prodi and his Commissioners, the suggestion that the Commission could ask 
for a vote of confidence by the Parliament was met with more scepticism (European 
Council 2000a).  
The following French Presidency disregarded the report made by the Portuguese. 
Their handling of the IGC has been accused of being partial, favouring the larger 
member states both by extending flexibility and blocking the extension of QMV 
(Beach 2005:147-151; Phinnemore 2003: 55-57). During their Presidency it became 
clear that there would be no agreement on sensitive issues prior to the final 
negotiations “The Presidency considers that it is premature to bring forward 
compromise proposals on three issues which are politically highly sensitive: the 
weighting of votes in the Council, the size and composition of the Commission and 
the allocation of seats in the European Parliament. It is generally acknowledged that 
these issues still require detailed discussion to bring the various points of view closer 
together and that they can only be decided at the highest level” (European Council 
2000b). However, concrete suggestions were put forwards both on the extension of 
powers for the Commission Presidency and the balance between the Commission and 
the EP, that was left in the final text (European Council 2000b; Treaty of Nice 2001).  
The results were seen in chapter three.  
 51
4.2 Change as intstitutional adaptation: Inter-institutional 
relations 
Parallel to the revision of the Treaty framework, the inter-institutional relations 
between the Commission and the European Parliament have undergone changes. In 
this section I will review the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament and see how they 
were applied in when the Prodi and Barroso Commissions were instated. 
Furthermore, I will see how these investiture procedures altered the relationship 
between the institutions through inter-institutional agreements. In doing so, I hope to 
be able to trace the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission.  
4.2.1 Rules of Procedure: Parliament’s adaptation 
The Parliament organises its work through its Rules of Procedure (Treaty on 
European Union 1992: Article 199).  The Rules of Procedure lay down the internal 
working methods of the Parliament as well as rules for their relations with other 
institutions. They are therefore a good indicator for the Parliament’s interpretation of 
their role given in the Treaties.  There has been a discrepancy between the internal 
rules of the Parliament and the Treaty framework. For the appointment of the 
Commission President and his college, the Parliament’s RoP go beyond the 
prerogatives awarded the Parliament through the Treaties. Though the Amsterdam 
Treaty introduced a separate Parliamentary vote of approval for the President-
designate, the Parliament had already adapted rules requesting the candidate to appear 
before the Parliament to make a statement followed by a vote of approval or 
rejection. If a candidate was rejected, the Parliament would ask the Council to 
withdraw the candidate (European Parliament 1993).  When Jaques Santer was 
nominated and later elected President of the Commission he was asked to appear 
before the Parliament (Nugent 2001: 65). Following the Amsterdam and Nice 
Treaties the President-designate is now expected to present his political guidelines to 
the Parliament before they vote over his candidature by secret ballot (European 
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Parliament 1999, 2003). Thus the political programme of the Commission is up for a 
vote.  
Similarly, the approval procedures for the College have gone beyond those stipulated 
in the Treaty framework. Even prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam Commissioners 
were asked to appear before the committee in charge of their respective policy field 
for hearings (European Parliament 1993). As seen above, though proposed by the 
Parliament, individual hearings of the Commissioners have never been adopted in the 
Treaty framework. However, though the Parliament scrutinise individual nominees, 
the college has traditionally been voted over as a whole only minor changes have 
been made to these provisions following changes in the Treaty framework. When the 
President of the Commission gained the power to reshuffle portfolios during the 
elected term of the Commission, the EP adapted its procedures and if such a shift is 
undertaken, the Commissioners in question will be asked to appear before the 
committees responsible for their policy area for questioning. Unlike the hearing of the 
President, the hearings of the candidates are public (European Parliament 2003). How 
were the Rules of Procedure applied in the nomination and election of the Prodi and 
Barroso Commissions?  
4.2.2 Nominating Prodi 
The first post-Amsterdam nomination of a Commission took place under rather 
special circumstances. The previous Santer Commission had been forced to leave 
office after allegations of fraud and mismanagement. Following damaging reports 
form both the Court of Auditors and a special committee set up within the EP, the 
Commission chose to resign its post as the EP prepared to make use of its right to 
censure (Nugent 2001:53-55). I will not go into detail on these proceedings, merely 
point out that the resignation followed a clear indication that a vote of censure would 
be held, not a actual vote.  
A new Commission had to be instated.  The heads of state and government chose to 
nominate his successor and his team for a full new term, and not just for the 
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remainder of Santer’s term (Dinan 2000:29). Prodi surfaced as the ideal candidate. 
According to the unofficial rota it was time for a President from a centre-left political 
background and from a southern member state (Dinan 2000: 29). Furthermore, he had 
the sought after political experience (Nugent 2001:67). The appointment of Prodi was 
seen to represent “a desire on the part of the member state to rejuvenate the institution 
by providing it with the leadership lacking under his immediate predecessor” (Kassim 
&Menon 2004: 29). Doing so they had equipped the Commission with the resources 
to perform its tasks rather than weakening it.  
The Parliament initially wanted the nomination of the new candidate to take place 
after the European Parliament election of June 1999 in order to make dependent on 
the outcome of the elections (Spence 2000: 6). They were not granted this privilege. 
However, once Prodi was nominated, the Parliament overwhelmingly approved 
Prodi’s candidature (392 in favour against 72 negative votes and 41 abstentions), 
even though he did not represent the largest party-group. They did however attach a 
resolution referring to an approval only for the remainder of Santer’s term (Jacobs 
1999:15). Prodi rejected this claim and threatened to resign if the Parliament insisted. 
The Parliament backed down (Nugent 2001: 68).  
The Amsterdam Treaty had strengthened the President of the Commission’s role in 
the nomination process, giving him the power to allocate the portfolios amongst the 
Commissioners. The member states still maintain the right to nominate the 
candidates.  Prodi had indicated that he would create portfolios and then seek 
candidates to fill them, not the other way around (Spence 2000: 7). However, most 
member states acted like they had done previously, not paying to much attention to 
the President-elect (Dinan 2000: 29).  As Neill Nugent points out, Prodi might have 
persuaded a few countries to reconsider their candidate, but there is not a single 
candidate that owed Prodi his or her position as a Commissioner (2001: 83). Though 
some conflict arose amongst the member states (Spence 2000:7), the allocation of 
portfolios amongst the candidates was an easier task than it had been earlier, given 
the President’s increase in influence over the process (Dinan 2000: 30). Prodi further 
 54 
strengthened his position within the college by having the Commissioners agree to 
resign if he wished them to (Nugent 2001: 56). I will return to this. 
Having failed to change the date for the nomination of the future President of the 
Commission, the President of the now largest party-group in the Parliament, Wilfred 
Martens, attempted to the Parliament assent dependent on a majority of centre-right 
Commissioners (Spence 2000: 6). The Parliament requested that the nominees to 
appear before Parliamentary committees defending their position in the College. Prior 
to this they had to hand in questionnaires dealing with their portfolio and the 
Commission as a whole. The hearings went relatively smoothly with only a few 
Commissioners being put under pressure (Nugent 2001: 85). Going beyond the 
Treaties, the Commissioner-nominees had to state that they were ready to resign if 
asked by their President (Spence 2000: 8). After the hearings, President-elect Prodi 
met with the political leaders of the political groups in the Parliament’s Committee of 
Presidents. Assuring them that he would reconsider the position of a Commissioner if 
the Parliament passed a vote of no confidence, the Parliament endorsed the 
Commission as a whole in a plenary session with 414 votes against 135, with 35 
abstentions (Nugent 2001: 86).  
4.2.3 Nominating Barroso 
Following the ratification of the Treaty of Nice, the Council nominate the President 
of the Commission by QMV (Treaty of Nice 2001).  According to the unofficial rota, 
a right-of-centre candidate from a smaller member state would succeed Prodi (Dinan 
2005: 49). Barroso was far from the first choice. Prior to his nomination, several 
candidates had been up for discussion in the European Council. Amongst others, the 
names of former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, Belgian Prime Minister 
Guy Verhofstadt, his colleague form Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker and External 
Relations Commissioner Chris Patten were put forwards (Dinan 2005: 49-50, Spence 
2006: 32-33). With France opposing Patten and Britain opposing Verhofstadt, 
Barroso emerged as an ‘ideal alternative’ (Dinan 2005: 49-50; Bache & George 2006: 
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214). As Dinan pointed out, the national leaders were not looking for a new Delors. 
Nobody wanted a situation were they were ‘overshadowed’ by the Commission 
President or where the Commission was in the driver’s seat of European integration 
(Dinan 2005: 54).  
The debate preceding the nomination of Barroso illustrated that the selection was no 
longer the sole prerogative of the Council, but that the candidate also needed to 
reflect the results of the EP elections (Christiansen 2006: 111). As the EPP/ED 
emerged as the largest political group in the June 2004 elections they demanded the 
result to reflect this (Beukers 2006: 24). In the end this was the result, but as seen, a 
centre-right candidate was the natural successor to Prodi (Westlake 2006: 266).This 
prerogative would however been granted the Parliament had the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (2004) been ratified in the members states. At the time the 
Parliament voted over the President-nominee, the Treaty was still on the table. The 
Parliament approved Barroso’s nomination with 413 votes against 251 (Dinan 2005: 
51).  
The allocation of portfolios in the College was done differently by the incoming 
President that the previous.   Barroso surprised the national leaders when assigning 
the portfolios in his college. He did not give in to the pressure from the larger 
member states by allocating their Commissioners the more important portfolios 
(Bache & George 214). Though both the French and the German Commissioners 
were made Vice-Presidencies, they were allocated the transport portfolio and the 
portfolio for enterprise and energy, hardly the most influential positions. According 
to Dinan, this helped Barroso ‘establish his authority’ with the new Commissioners 
and some of the national leaders (Dinan 2005: 52).  
Though Barroso himself was approved by a large majority by the Parliament, he had 
great difficulties gaining the support for his College. As stated in the Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure, the nominees were requested to appear before the committee in 
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charge of their respective portfolios for hearings. The Parliament raised a number of 
issues8. However, it was the Italian candidate, Rocco Buttiglione’s hearing that 
received the most attention. As he appeared to defend his nomination as 
Commissioner for Justice, freedom and security he made remarks that did not go 
down well with the committees in charge. The process resulted in a vote9, a novel 
invention. Buttiglione was voted down. As the Parliament can only give a vote on the 
Commission as a whole, the committee made the decision for the whole Parliament. 
This thus went far beyond the provisions granted the EP through the Treaties.  
The Parliament sent Barroso their evaluation of his nominees. He met with the 
conference of Presidents trying to come up with a compromise. The political groups 
made their demands and Barroso in his attempt to broker an agreement and gain the 
support of the majority of MEPs offered to reshuffle some of Buttigliones 
responsibilities. In the following plenary session Barroso had to admit defeat and 
postponed the proposal for his team (Beukers 2006: 27-34). As the European leaders 
gathered to sign the Constitutional Treaty, Barroso managed to forge an agreement 
between the member states of a new list of nominees with a new Italian candidate. 
The Latvian candidate later withdrew and the Hungarian was assigned a different 
portfolio. A new round of hearings were held in the Parliament, and this time his 
whole team was approved (ibid.: 35).   
4.2.4  Interinstitutional agreements 
Following both the Prodi Commission investiture and the Barroso Commission 
investiture, the EP and the Commission signed inter-institutional agreements 
                                              
8 For the Dutch candidate for the competition portfolio, Neelie Kroes, questions were raised about her independence. As for 
the Greek nominee for the environment portfolio, the committee expressed doubt about his willingness to promote 
environment vis-à-vis business. With Laszlo Kovacs, the Hungarian candidate for the energy portfolio, the parliament 
committee criticized his lack of preparation and his competencies on the field. The Danish nominee, up for the agriculture 
portfolio was questioned about a possible conflict of interests and the Latvian Ingrida Udre, intended the Taxation and 
Customs Union portfolio was questioned about her party’s finances (European Parliament 2004). 
9 The chairmen of the committees are responsible for writing a report summarising the viewpoints of its members after a 
hearing. As the members of the committee questioning the Italian candidate could not agree, and the matter was referred 
back to the committees’ members who decided to call for a vote.  
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mapping out the relations between the two institutions. The inter-institutional 
agreements claim to “strengthen the responsibility and legitimacy of the 
Commission” by holding them more responsible towards the Parliament (European 
Commission and the European Parliament 2000; 2005). In both cases the role of the 
Parliament and its influence over the Commission was strengthened and go far 
beyond their formal role (Kietz & Maurer).   
The Parliament laid claim on a broader investiture procedure than what was instated 
with the Treaty of Amsterdam in the following inter-institutional agreement. Though 
the Treaty only provided the Parliament for the power to hold the President 
responsible for the policies of the college, the Parliament and the Commission agreed 
to extend this to the Commissioners as well “Without prejudice to the principle of 
Commission collegiality, each Member of the Commission shall take political 
responsibility for action in the field for which he or she is responsible” (European 
Commission and the European Parliament 2000). This also would also apply in case 
of a reshuffling of portfolios during the Commissions term of office. Furthermore, the 
Commission agreed to extend the Parliament’s influence to also include a possible 
negative vote “The Commission accepts that, where the European Parliament 
expresses lack of confidence in a Member of the Commission (subject to the 
substantive and representative nature of the political support for such a view), the 
President of the Commission shall examine seriously whether he should request that 
Member to resign” (European Commission and the European Parliament 2000). 
The revised framework agreement following the Barroso Commission’s election into 
office is largely the same. It introduced a new procedure in case a Commissioner has 
to leave office, committing the President to include the Parliament in its replacement 
according to its prerogatives (European Commission and the European Parliament 
2005). Interestingly, the Parliament’s influence was not extended to include a vote of 
confidence on individual Commissioners.  
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4.3 Change as internal leadership 
In what way is the special role of the President reflected in the way the Commission 
works and how has the capacity of the Commission President been adapted to fill his 
new role? Has there been an increase in the resources available? Furthermore can the 
strengthening of the Presidency be seen in internal reforms? I will review the 
President’s role in the internal Rules of Procedure to the Commission, the resources 
available for him to fill the role of political guide. First, a short comment on the 
recent reform processes in the Commission. 
Following the Santer Commission’s resignation, his successor Romano Prodi took 
office on a platform of reform. The reform process, completed in 2004, dealt, 
amongst other things, with administrative practices and the culture of the 
Commission (Commission 2000c; Stevens & Stevens 2006: 63-78). However, there 
are no signs of a continuous reform process within the Commission. Reform of the 
internal hierarchy of the Commission and it’s relationship with the EP were dealt 
with through internal arrangements within the Commission, through interinstitutional 
agreements and through the upcoming Treaty reform, all of which are dealt with 
above (Christiansen 2006: 112).   
4.3.1 Commission adaptation: Rules of Procedure  
The Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the Presidents role in shaping the policies of the 
Commission by awarding the incumbent the right to lay down the political guidelines. 
The RoP of the Commission were adapted to reflect this “The Commission shall act 
collectively in accordance with these Rules and in compliance with the political 
guidelines laid down by the President” (European Commission 1993; 1999b). Based 
on these, the Commission would establish its priorities and adopt yearly work 
programmes. As the Barroso Commission was instated they adapted their working 
mode to also include the formulation of multi-annual strategic coals (European 
Commission 2005). Furthermore, the newly instated powers of political guidance 
were interpreted to include the possibility of establishing groups of Commissioners 
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(European Commission 1999b). I will return to this in the following section. The 
procedural framework was also adapted to include the presidential prerogative of the 
allocation and reallocation of tasks within the Commission. Though strengthening the 
position of the President, these changes were only formally adopted after the Treaty 
revision.  
The President sets the agenda (and may keep topics off the agenda). He convenes and 
chairs the meetings of the College. The RoP furthermore states that he represents the 
Commission. In this capacity he may attend meetings with other bodies, such as 
COREPER and meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the member states. He 
represents the Commission in meetings with the Presidents of the Council and of the 
EP as well as informal meetings with the Heads of State and Government (European 
Commission 1999b; 2005; Nugent 2001: 70). These provisions contribute to the 
internal hierarchy of the Commission.  
On the other hand, the internal guidelines for the Commission continue to emphasise 
collegiality. Thought the President is awarded the power to shape the overall strategy, 
the Commissioners still enjoy broad discretion over their respective policy fields, and 
the President is not awarded an additional vote if the college decides to vote over an 
issue. Any member of the college can call for a vote (European Commission 1993; 
1999b; 2005).  
Following the Treaty revision in Amsterdam, the President allocates and may 
reallocate the portfolios of the Commissioners. The Rules of Procedure were adapted 
to reflect this (European Commission 1999b).  Going even further, the 
Commissioners in the Prodi Commission agreed to leave office if asked to by the 
President. This arrangement appeared in the Code of Conduct for the Commission, a 
part of the broader reform process undertaken by Prodi and his Commission. This 
appeared as an annex to the Rules of Procedure of the institution (European 
Commission 2000b). Thus when this was codified at Nice no changes were made to 
the Rules of Procedure. Neither do they specify any procedure is this was to occur. It 
can therefore be said that this preceded the treaty revisions.  
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4.3.2 Commission adaptation: leadership resources 
As the Prodi Commission took office, the President was able to set up working 
groups within the Commission10. These were named Commissioners’ Groups 
(European Commission 1999b). The objectives of the groups were to prepare and co-
ordinate the activities of the Commission, taking into account the priorities of the 
Commission and under the political guidance of the President. The President of the 
Commission decides on the composition and mandate of the groups and may chair 
them himself or bestow it on another member of the Commission (European 
Commission 1999c). Christiansen has pointed out that the creation of 
Commissioner’s Groups has served to strengthen the Commission Presidency. As the 
groups bring together a number of Commissioners on areas of Commission policies 
the horizontal coordination is improved. By attending and chairing these, they 
improve the President’s potential for control over the College (Christiansen 2006: 
114).  
President Prodi had five such groups set up. He chaired two of them himself, the 
Growth, competitiveness, employment and sustainable development-group and the 
Equal opportunities-group. The remaining three groups, the reform-group, the group 
for interinstitutional relations and the groups charged with External Relations were all 
chaired by Vice-Presidents, Kinnock, de Palacio and Patten respectively. In addition, 
all groups had both permanent members and were open to other Commissioners if 
needed (European Commission 1999d).  
As Barroso put his team together he launched five such informal groups. Two of 
these he chaired himself, one on the Lisbon strategy and the External Relations-
group. A group on communications and programming, a group for equal 
opportunities and, a Group of Commissioners for the Competitiveness Council were 
                                              
10 These are by no means the only leadership resources available to the Commission Presidency. However, as the formal 
scope has been chosen, the adaptation of the change in formal provisions are presented. 
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also set up led by Vice-President Wallström, Commissioner Špidla and 
Commissioner Mandelson respectively (European Commission 2004).  
A similar institutional setup exists within the Commission’s services. The Forward 
Studies Unit, better known by its French name, Cellule de Prospective, was set up as 
a directorate within the Secretariat General during Delors’ Presidency. The group was 
a think tank charged with research and forward planning, concentrating mainly on 
coordinating Commission policies (Nugent 2001: 152). As Romano Prodi took office 
he broadened the role and tasks of the unit in order to further his capacity to lead the 
Commission. Renaming it The Economic and Political Council, he strengthened its 
ability for political analysis in order to “assist me as President in developing and 
implementing policies” (Prodi 2000). He later renamed it the Group of Policy 
advisers (GOPA) (European Voice 2005). The institutional structure was thereby 
adapted to help the President fulfil his function as political guide.  
The structure was continued during Barroso’s Commission under the name Bureau of 
European Policy Advisors (BEPA). It is now a separate unit within the Services; the 
think tank reports directly to Barroso and acts under his authority. It cooperates 
closely with the Presidents cabinet.  The group assists and provides advice for the 
President. It may also assist the Commissioners and the other DGs where appropriate. 
Its functions range from appraising policy options to writing the speeches for the 
President as well as analysing present policies (Bureau of European Policy Advisors 
2007). Similarly to the Commissioner’s Groups the think thank thus helps the 
President in leading the Commission. By providing analyses and helping coordinate 
the Commission’s work BEPA can therefore be thought to strengthen the President’s 




5. The Commission between integration and 
organisational dynamics  
Why have we seen a strengthening of the Commission Presidency and a growing 
dependence on the European Parliament by the European Commission? Can it be 
seen as a process driven forward by states as rational actors or by the European 
institutions adapting their roles? Is it perhaps part of a larger trend? In this chapter I 
will apply the theoretical framework on the data looking to see if the perspectives 
presented can help shed light on the empirical findings. To what extent do they 
produce credible explanations for the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of 
the European Commission?   
The analysis will be presented in three parts. The first section will analyse the 
processes in light of intergovernmental theory and the assumption of the states as the 
primary actors. The second will view the Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation 
through rational choice institutionalism and seek explanations through the utility 
maximising behaviour of institutions. In the third and final section I will evaluate the 
processes at hand through the perspective of organisational environment. To what 
extent can they be viewed as reflections of legitimised organisational forms in the 
broader society?    
5.1  Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation as state 
driven 
Revisiting the assumptions of intergovernmental theory we see that we can expect the 
Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission to be a state run 
process. The European institutions serve as means for the member states and have 
little influence over the integration process. How can these postulations shed light on 
the data presented in chapter four? To what extent has Parliamentarisation and 
Presidentialisation been driven forwards by Treaty negotiations? To what extent do 
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they reflect the opinions of the member states, and more importantly, to what extent 
has the opinions of the institutions been left out of the Treaty framework? These are 
essential questions when viewing the processes through the eyes of 
intergovernmental theory. 
Enhancing the efficiency of the Commission 
As seen in chapter three, three indicators have suggested a strengthening of the 
Presidents role within the European Commission: the Presidential prerogative to set 
out the political guidelines of the Commission’s work, the Presidents prerogative to 
allocate and reallocate portfolios amongst the Commissioners and the Presidents 
power to ask a Commissioner to leave office. In the following section I will argue 
that these processes may be seen as cases of institutional design negotiated through 
the intergovernmental conferences.  
In line with the assumptions that institutions are set up insofar as they help inter-state 
cooperation, functional arguments were employed as the President of the 
Commission was granted the prerogative to lay down the political guidelines for the 
Commission. As seen, these provisions have further been used to increase the 
resources available for the President to lead the College, thus strengthening his 
position vis-à-vis the member states. How can this be seen as the will of the member 
states? The arguments put forwards by the member states were mainly with regards to 
the efficiency of the institutions and are evident in the conclusions of the Council 
Presidencies. The data presented in chapter four suggest that the strengthening of the 
President’s position was closely linked to the size of the Commission. A stronger 
President was introduced as a remedy to uphold the efficiency in a Commission with 
one Commissioner per member state, even after enlargement. The strengthening of 
the Commission President would therefore postpone the reduction of Commissioners, 
and each member state could therefore keep its commissioner. Thus, it may not be 
seen to weaken the member states, but a means to enable them to uphold their 
national influence over the Commission.   
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Moreover, the continued emphasis put on collegiality as a value for the Commission, 
by both the member states and the Commission itself, may indicate that the 
strengthening of the Commission Presidency was more of administrative reform, 
introduced to keep the efficiency of the Commission, than a strengthening of the 
political position of the President per se. The data further suggest that the 
introduction of this prerogative should not be taken to be an isolated process, but 
should be seen as part of a wider range of reforms to strengthen the efficiency of the 
Commission.  
The extension of the Presidential prerogatives to include the nomination of 
Commissioners, as well as the allocation and reallocation of portfolios, made the 
President a formal part of electing the college. One might argue that this significantly 
increases the position of the President as he may, together with the Council (and the 
Parliament), decide on the composition of the Commission. Can this be explained by 
viewing the member states as the more important actors? By reviewing the data of 
chapter four we see that this prerogative has been strongly coupled with the 
strengthening of the President’s ability to lead the work of the Commission. Member 
states argued that this is necessary for the Commission to be able to fill its functions. 
As such, it can be viewed as institutional design in the sense that they were both 
awarded the President in order for him to better steer the work of the Commission, 
and in doing so, making it a more efficient body.  
The influences of the Commission President have also been limited. Though the 
President will enjoy a larger say, the member states still retain the power to put names 
forward for the position of Commissioner, and their nomination is based on 
nationality. They are therefore still largely a part of the process. As seen with the 
Prodi Commission, the member states largely ignored Prodi when tabling candidates. 
Thus the yielding of this prerogative to the President may not have been the most 
important. By strengthening the President the member states may have created a more 
efficient procedure for the nomination of the Commission. By reducing their own 
role, they may have made it easier to come to an agreement, and at the same time, 
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making it possible to weigh factors such as sex and competence against each other. 
However, as seen with the Barroso Commission, the nomination process was to a 
larger extent done contrary to what the member states might have expected. Not 
primarily with the nomination of the Commissioner, but when awarding the 
portfolios.  
With the Treaty of Nice the President of the Commission was awarded the power to 
ask a Commissioner to leave office. A simple explanation for the extension of the 
Presidential prerogatives would be that this reflected the crisis preceding it, namely 
the resignation of the Santer Commission. Such an institutional interruption can 
hardly be said to be in the interest of the member states, and by granting the President 
this privilege one could avoid a similar situation in the future. The extension of the 
Presidential prerogatives may therefore be seen as institutional design. However, this 
was not a novel invention. It had already been tabled at Amsterdam, but been kept out 
of the Treaty framework. Neither was it an issue as the Nice IGC was initiated. As 
seen in chapter four it was only added to the agenda after the institutions had been 
consulted. On the other hand, the data can not exclude the possibility that this was 
driven forward by the member states. This raises a number of questions, and I will 
return to this in the following section.  
Though the President of the Commission obtained the power to dismiss individual 
Commissioners, he still has no function in finding a replacement. The member states 
have retained this power. This significantly reduces the President’s opportunities of 
using this prerogative to shape the Commission to his preferences. However, this 
prerogative has never been used, and any suggestion for how this would take place is 
mere speculation. On an interesting note, the Parliament was not awarded a 
prerogative to conduct a vote of censure on individual Commissioners, but only kept 
its possibility to vote over the Commission in its entirety. I will return to this in the 
following sections.  
The empirical findings of chapter four shows that the Commission and the 
Parliament have argued for a strengthening of the Presidential prerogatives. The 
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official opinion of both the Commission and the Parliament to the Amsterdam IGC 
and the Nice IGC show that they have sought to bestow the Commission President 
with a larger say in both the policies and the composition of the Commission. As this 
was granted in the Treaty revisions, one might suggest that the European institutions 
have been of influence to the processes. In line with intergovernmental theory we can 
draw a different conclusion. The Commission Presidency has gained influences 
through its Rules of Procedure, the prerogative to guide its own work through these 
working arrangements has been granted the Commission as a whole by the member 
states. Furthermore, the data suggest thatthe European institutions may get their 
preferences through so long as they coincide with the interests of the member states. 
If they don’t, they are left out. The Parliamentarisation of the relationship between 
the Commission and the Parliament is an example of this. I will elaborate on this in 
the subsequent section.   
Limiting Parliamentarism 
Previous to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the Parliament only enjoyed a negative 
power over the Commission, as it was able to conduct a vote of censure on the 
Commission. With the Treaty revisions in question, the Parliament was granted the 
power of positive investiture, enabling it to vote on the Commission President as well 
as the Commission as a whole. How can the increasing parliamentary prerogatives be 
interpreted in light of intergovernmental theory? Does the data support the 
assumption of the primacy of the member states?  
The data suggest a rather different explanation for the Parliamentarisation of 
Commission-Parliament relations than the strengthening of the Commission. Unlike 
the size and composition of the Commission, the role of the Parliament in the 
Commission nomination procedure was less of an issue as the member states set out 
to revise the Treaties (though the position of the Parliament in the Union was an 
important issue). There was a broad agreement to strengthen its position. 
Nonetheless, the European Parliament has been seeking a stronger role for itself. 
Throughout the later Treaty revisions, the Parliament has called for a stronger role, 
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and they have been granted a stronger role. This might be seen to negate the 
postulations of intergovernmental theory. However, the data calls for a more nuanced 
picture.  
In the opinions delivered by the Parliament we see that they have sought to be able to 
dismiss Commissioners as well as for the Commission to ask for a positive vote of 
investiture by the Parliament. Both would increase the parliamentary traits of the 
Commission-Parliament relations significantly. Neither demand was granted through 
the interstate negotiations. Employing intergovernmental theory it may therefore be 
suggested that that the Parliament ambition has been successfully reduced, and the 
Parliament has only been granted the power and functions the member states wish to 
bestow on the body.  
Furthermore, as seen, the Parliament has sought a stronger role for itself in the 
nomination of the Commission President, asking for the prerogative to elect him 
based on a list of candidates nominated by the member states. As seen from the IGC 
preceding the Treaty of Amsterdam and the IGC preceding the Treaty of Nice, 
though emphasised in the official opinions of the Parliament, this was not put on the 
agenda by the member states. This may suggest that even though the Parliament has 
called for a stronger role, and has to an extent been granted a stronger role, the role of 
the Parliament has been significantly less influential than what they have called for. 
As seen in chapter four, it is the prerogative of the member states to define this role. 
The data may therefore be seen to support the assumption of the primacy of the 
member states in the IGC and their prerogative to limit the influence of the 
institutions, corroborating the postulations of intergovernmental theory. However, the 
data does not offer any explanation as to why the EP was granted a more influential 
role. I will return to this in the following sections.  
The salience of issues 
Common to the reforms strengthening the position of the President and making the 
Commission more dependent on the Parliament is that the issues were all resolved in 
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the very last phases of the intergovernmental conferences. As seen in chapter four the 
European institutions have little say in the final phases of the negotiation process. 
The data has further shown us that the topics cleared in this phase are questions 
where little agreement has been met throughout the previous interstate negotiations.  
This corroborates the intergovernmental perspective as it supports the primacy of the 
member states when setting up and renegotiating the mandates of the European 
institutions. As the analyses above point out, in this process the member states have 
chosen to accommodate the wishes of the institutions, but have also chosen not to.  
Though the extension of the Presidential prerogatives may be viewed as a salient 
issue, and to a certain degree has strengthened the institution vis-à-vis the member 
states, it was coupled with even more salient issues, and topics even more sensitive 
with regard to member state sovereignty such as the number of Commissioners and 
the possibility to designate national Commissioners. Thus it looks like the member 
states may have chosen one over the other. The process surrounding the 
Parliamentarisation of Commission-Parliament relations is rather different. The 
member states were in agreement on a wish to strengthen this dependence as the 
Amsterdam negotiation round was initiated. Moreover, the data suggest that this was 
less of an issue, or at least an issue where the member states were more in agreement. 
Furthermore, the arguments used for the strengthening of the Parliament’s 
prerogatives are tied up to the legitimacy of the Commission, and the documents 
analysed show that the more important issue was whether or not to make individual 
Commissioners dependent on the will of the Parliament. As seen, the Parliamentary 
prerogatives were not extended that far. Moreover, the strengthening of the EP may 
go against a wish to make the Commission a more efficient body. This leads us over 
to the inter-institutional relations. I will elaborate on this in the following section.  
Limits to intergovernmentalism 
As seen in the hypotheses in chapter two, intergovernmental theory presupposes that 
the Treaties guard the work of the institutions and that the working arrangements of 
the institutions reflect agreements between the member states. Though the increasing 
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influence of the institutions can be defended on the basis of intergovernmental 
assumptions, the institutions are not awarded any influence on their own. 
Intergovernmental theory therefore falls short on explaining the adaptation of the 
formal framework undertaken by the European Commission and the European 
Parliament through their working arrangements and inter-institutional arrangements.  
Moreover, intergovernmental theory presupposes that the IGCs are the arenas for 
change and where decisions on the functions of the institutions are taken. As the data 
show, the Treaty revisions were merely a formalisation of the President of the 
Commission’s right to ask a Commissioner to leave, as this had already been put in 
place with agreements between Romano Prodi and his Commissioners. Furthermore, 
the Commission-Parliament relations are not only guarded by the Treaties, but also 
inter-institutional agreements. For a full understanding of the Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the Commission we therefore need to supplement this 
perspective with a perspective that broadens the intergovernmental assumptions on 
actors and arenas.  
5.2 Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation as 
institution driven 
As seen in chapter two, institutional theories extend both the intergovernmental 
assumptions of actors and arenas. How can these assumptions shed light on the 
processes of Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation? How can the perspective 
add to our understanding of the processes? Employing the postulations of rational 
choice institutionalism I will analyse whether the Commission and Parliament used 
the intergovernmental conferences to extend their position. Furthermore employing 
their extended assumptions of arenas, I will seek to explain the two processes by the 
way the Parliament and the Commission have adapted the formal provisions in their 
working arrangements, focusing particularly on the working arrangements of the 
Commission and the inter-institutional arrangements between the Commission and 
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the Parliament. To what extent does the data corroborate the assumption of utility 
maximising institutions?  
5.2.1 Presidentialisation as rational action 
As seen in chapter three and chapter four the President of the Commission has seen a 
broadening of his prerogatives. To what extent does the data corroborate the 
assumption of the Commission as a rational actor? To what extend has the 
Commission used the intergovernmental conferences and its working arrangements to 
extent the mandate and strengthen the Presidential traits of the Commission? By 
reviewing the processes, both formal and informal connected to the extension of the 
Presidential prerogatives I will show that the intergovernmental assumptions need to 
be extended in order for us to understand these processes.  
As seen above, the President’s role within the Commission was significantly 
strengthened with the Treaty of Amsterdam. The incumbent gained the power to lay 
down the political guidelines for the work of the Commission, take part in the 
nomination of the Commissioners, and allocate and reallocate the portfolios amongst 
them. How can this be explained? The data show that the Commission argued for the 
inclusions of these prerogatives based on the efficiency of the Commission and the 
possibility for the President to weigh different interests. Furthermore, the data show 
that the member states called for the strengthening of the Commission and included 
the topic on the agenda for the intergovernmental conference. Thus we can not isolate 
the extension of the Presidential prerogatives to the Commission. Though this may 
not exclude the possibility for the Commission to be influential in the results of the 
negotiation round, we need to take a look at the way the Commission adapt these 
provisions to seek verification of the perspective.  
Political guide or administrative leader?  
To what extent does the implementation of the Treaty framework suggest that it has 
been used to strengthen the position of the President? The Commission’s working 
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arrangements show a gradual increase of resources for political guidance. However, 
for the President’s role in setting the political guidelines for the Commission, these 
adaptations of their working arrangements have followed Treaty revisions. 
Corroborating the assumption of the Commission as a rational actor, they may be 
seen to extend the formal mandate. As seen in chapter four, Prodi used this provision 
to set up the Commissioners’ groups. These groups may be seen to enhance the 
President’s influences the policies and his ability to steer the work of the 
Commission. They may increase the President’s ability to engage in the policy fields 
of the Commissioners. As the data show, he further strengthened and altered the 
mandate of what is now knows as the Bureau of European Policy Advisors. These 
changes may be expected to increase the President’s influence and possibilities to set 
the future goals for the Commission. The Treaty provisions do not specify any 
structural adaptation of these and do not state that the establishing of new groups. The 
adaptation of the formal provisions may therefore be said to have significantly 
increase the powers of the Commission Presidency. Thus they may be viewed as a 
strategic adaptation. However, the data does not allow for the elimination of the 
possibility that the member states foresaw this.  
The Rules of Procedure further call for a more balanced picture of the President’s role 
within the college. Though the working arrangements support the image of a strong 
President, collegiality is highly valued within the Commission. The President leads 
the work of the Commission, but the College as a whole is still held responsible. 
Moreover, the data show that if a vote is called for within the college, the President is 
only given one vote. As seen, the Commissioners enjoy a large influence over their 
portfolios. Again, this may suggest a more administrative reform than an actual 
transference of political power to the President. I will return to this in the following 
section.  
Securing collegiality  
Collegiality was used as an argument as the Commission sought for the President to 
gain the power to nominate, allocate and reallocate portfolios amongst the 
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Commissioners. This significantly increases the President’s influence over the 
college. The Commission argued that this would “better ensure collegiality” and it 
would enable the President to weigh different interests. How were these new 
influences applied?  As chapter four shows, the working arrangements of the 
Commission were adapted to include the new prerogatives. Conversely, the data 
suggest that Romano Prodi’s influence over the nomination of his college may have 
been weaker than the formal provisions provided for. On the other hand, Barroso 
enjoyed a larger say as he put together his college. Interestingly neither Prodi nor 
Barroso used this process to stretch their mandate with respect to their role in the 
nomination process. As will be shown in the following section, Prodi extended his 
position in other respects. Moreover, the data suggest a significant role played by the 
European Parliament in these procedures. I will return to this below.  
The data does not give any support for the role of the President in the reallocation of 
portfolios. There is no indication that this provision has been used actively to change 
the profile of the Commission. If we look away from the rearranging of policy areas 
as a consequence of the enlargement process, and the voluntary resignation of 
Commissioners resuming other posts, it has yet to be put to use11. It is therefore 
difficult to predict how this would be done. Furthermore, the role of the Parliament in 
this procedure is not yet clear.  
Presidentialisation through individual agreements 
Though Prodi did not extend the prerogative of the President to nominate 
Commissioners, the putting together of the Prodi Commission introduced a new 
practice. As the data show, Prodi had his Commissioners agree to step down if asked 
to by the President. It was also a demand of the Parliament as they voted over the 
Commission. At the time, this did not have any formal backing, but was subsequently 
                                              
11 In addition to the Commissioners from the the ten new member states, five Commissioners left the Prodi Commission to 
take on other post as their term drew to its end (European Commission 2006). With the Barroso Commission 
rearrangements were made to award postfolios to the Bulgarian and Romanian Commissioners following the 2007 
enlargement (European Commission 2007).   
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included in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Furthermore, it was included 
in the inter-institutional agreement between the Commission and the Parliament. This 
corroborates both the assumption of the Commission as a rational actor as well as the 
assumption of the Parliament as a rational actor. As seen in the following negotiation 
round with the Treaty of Nice, the role and functions of the Commission Presidency 
was put on the agenda after consulting the institutions. Both the Commission and the 
Parliament argued for the formalisation of this practice, and as the IGC drew to its 
end, the provision was included in the formal Treaty framework. Thus we see that the 
intergovernmental negotiations were a mere formalisation if established practises. 
Moreover, we see that the President of the Commission successfully used his position 
in the nomination process to extend his mandate, corroborating the assumption of 
institutions as rational actors. Furthermore, this process highlights inter-institutional 
relations as a mechanism for the strengthening of the positions of the institutions. I 
will return to this in the following section.  
5.2.2 Parliamentarisation as rational action 
As seen in chapter three and four the Commission’s dependence on the Parliament 
has been significantly strengthened with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of 
Nice. Both the Commission President and the Commissioners have been made 
dependent on a positive vote in the Parliament, and with the Barros nomination the 
Parliament elections influenced the outcome. However, as seen in the analysis above, 
the member states have been rather reluctant to give in to the aspirations of the 
Parliament. As with the Commission we need to look at the adaptation of the formal 
provisions and see to what extent the mandates has been widened to isolate the effect 
of the institution.   
Applying the assumptions of rational choice institutionalism we need to analyse how 
the Parliament has employed less formal means to strengthen its position. 
Furthermore, we need to analyse the Parliament’s interaction with the Commission.  
To what extend does the data corroborate the assumption of the Parliament as a 
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rational actor? To what extent has the formal provisions been extended as they adapt 
the Treaty framework? More importantly, how have the mandates of the Parliament 
been widened as they interact with the Commission? By reviewing the data I will 
show that the intergovernmental assumptions need to be extended.  
From assent to investiture through informal adaptation 
Though the Parliament has not been granted the role it has asked for in the 
nomination procedures, the process still yields some interesting findings for the 
organisational dynamics of the European Union. How have the institutions extended 
this role? The Treaty of Amsterdam formalised an already established arrangement 
between the European Parliament and the European Commission. A parliamentary 
vote on the President-nominee was incorporated into the Treaties. Such a vote had 
already taken place as the Santer Commission was instated. (Had he been voted 
down, the Parliament would have asked the member states to nominate a new 
candidate.)  The data therefore suggests a process alternating between formal 
negotiations and informal adaptations for the changing role of the Parliament in the 
nomination of the Commission. Furthermore, this process yields information on the 
relationship between the Commission and the Parliament. As seen in chapter four 
both institutions had argued for this procedure to be formally adopted, the Parliament 
to strengthen its role and the Commission to enhance their legitimacy. I will return to 
this argument below.  
Can the data verify the hypotheses that the Parliament will use working arrangements 
to extend its formal mandate? The data show that the working arrangements of the 
Parliament have been adapted following Treaty revision. As the role of the 
Commission Presidency was strengthened, the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament 
and the inter-institutional agreement between the Commission and the Parliament 
were amended. The political role of the President was reiterated in the inter-
institutional relations. Following the Amsterdam Treaty, the President was expected 
to present his working programme before the Parliament prior to their vote, extending 
the formal provisions. Thus we see the inter-institutional arrangements are making 
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the Commission potentially more politically dependent on the Parliament than the 
formal framework would entail. 
From collective to individual accountability?  
The Parliament has moved to include a vote of approval on individual 
Commissioners in the formal framework. Such a prerogative has been kept put of the 
Treaty framework, but interestingly the working arrangements of the Parliament and 
the inter-institutional agreements have been revised to strengthen the position of the 
Parliament. However, these have not gone as far as to indicate an investiture 
procedure for individual Commissioners. Going beyond the formal framework, we 
see that the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament and the inter-institutional 
arrangements have made the Commissioners more dependent on the will of the 
Parliament. As the Prodi Commission was instated, the Commissioners-nominees 
were asked to appear before the Parliament committees in charge of their respective 
policy fields for hearings. On the other hand, the College was voted over as a whole. 
As chapter four shows, the Commissioners were voted over as the Barroso 
Commission was instated, resulting in one committee voting down a candidate, and 
the Parliament subsequently asked Barroso to present a new candidate. Unlike 
previous procedures, a vote on individual Commissioners was neither included in the 
Rules of Procedure of the Parliament nor the inter-institutional agreement. The inter-
institutional agreements increase the dependence of the Commissioners on the 
Parliament, but there has been no agreement on a vote between the two institutions. 
Moreover, the Commission continue to emphasise collegiality in their relations to the 
Parliament. Thus we see that the data corroborates the assumption that the institutions 
act rationally to strengthen their position, but that they may not seek the same results.  
I will return to this in the following section.  
On an interesting note, though these arrangements claim to have made the 
Commission more politically dependent on the will of the Parliament, none of the 
candidates voted over by the Parliament were voted down based on party politics. 
The two candidates rejected in the Barroso Commission were so based on accusations 
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of incompetence and discrimination, not policies. The hearings are not based on 
ideology, but competences. Further questioning the parliamentary nature of these 
relations is the reaction that these procedures evoked. It was not seen as a 
parliamentary system in the making and a Parliament enforcing its right; it was seen 
as an institutional crisis. I will return to this in the following section.  
Political accountability? 
The Barroso nomination introduced a procedure that would make the Commission 
more politically dependent on the Parliament. As seen with the Prodi nomination, the 
Parliament sought to postpone the nomination of a candidate for President till after 
the 1999 Parliament elections, making the nomination dependent of the election 
results. This would have significantly strengthened the parliamentary traits of the 
Commission-Parliament relations. As seen in chapter four the date of the nomination 
was kept, but the Parliament nonetheless approved Prodi’s candidature. As Barroso 
was nominated, this was altered. The candidate for President would first be put 
forwards after the 2004 European elections indicating that the results would influence 
the choice of candidate. As seen, Barroso emerged as a candidate, closely connected 
to the EPP/ED, the now largest party group of the European Parliament.   
However, the data can not exclusively isolate Barroso’s nomination to the EP 
elections. As the data show, he was far from the first candidate, and not only did he 
reflect the Parliament election results, he also filled the criteria of the unofficial rota 
for the Commission Presidency. Moreover, at the time of the Barroso Commission 
election the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe was still on the table. Had it 
been ratified by the member states the Parliament would have been granted this 
prerogative (as seen in chapter three this prerogative has been continued in the 
Reform Treaty). Thus as it stands, it was introduced prior to formalisation, but this 
factor makes it difficult to isolate this to the innovative use of the formal framework 
by the Parliament. If the practice is continued, it will significantly move the Union 
towards a Parliamentary system. However, as seen above, ideology and party politics 
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has been less of a factor than one might expect in the parliamentary systems of the 
member states.  
Institutional equilibrium 
Parallel to the claim of a stronger role in the Commission nomination procedure, the 
Parliament has called for the power to call a vote of no confidence on individual 
Commissioners. Common to the increase in influence over the investiture procedures, 
this has also been kept out of the formal framework, but been introduced through the 
inter-institutional agreement between the Parliament and the Commission. As the 
data show, the Parliament has called for such a prerogative for itself and for the 
Commission President even prior to the Santer crisis.  Though the President of the 
Commission was granted this prerogative at Nice, the Parliament was not. The 
informal arrangement precedes this. As Prodi sought the approval of his college he 
agreed to consider the position of the Commissioner if a vote was in fact taken in the 
Parliament. As mentioned above, the Commissioners-nominees also had to convince 
the Parliament that they would resign if the President of the Commission asked them 
to. Thus we see that the Parliament was not granted a full right to conduct a vote for 
dismissal, but that a vote is conditioned on the will of the President. Both procedures 
were written into the inter-institutional agreement following the Prodi Commission’s 
instatement. I will argue that this process strengthens the hypotheses of the rational 
choice perspective. Together with the Parliament’s increasing influence over the 
nomination of the Commission, we see an increasing Parliamentarisation of 
Commission-Parliament relations evolving outside the formal frameworks. This 
yields a number of questions for further study. Why is the Commission voluntarily 
submitting itself to the influences of the Parliament?  
These informal processes puts focus on another interesting matter. The Parliament 
and the Commission seem to differ on their perception of the relationship between the 
two institutions, in particular with regards to positive and negative investiture. The 
Parliament seems to argue for the strengthening of parliamentary traits and individual 
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accountability, while the Commission uphold their collegiality. This raises questions 
of values, norms and ideology. I will return to this in the following section.   
5.3 Limits to rationality: Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation as myth driven 
Intergovernmental theory and rational choice institutionalism has left a few questions 
unanswered. The state oriented perspective has difficulty explaining why power has 
been transferred from the member states to the European institutions. As seen above, 
the transferral of power to the Commission Presidency was done to enhance the 
efficiency of the Commission and to keep it an efficient institution even after 
enlargement. The rationale for enhancing the role of the Parliament, on the other hand 
is not as easily given. Rational choice institutionalism encounters the same problem. 
The strengthening of the President of the Commission and the Parliament’s pursue of 
a larger role in the European Union can both be explained by the assumption of 
rational actors. On the other hand, the postulations of rationality have problems 
explaining why the Commission voluntarily will submit itself to the influences of the 
Parliament.  
As seen in chapter two the assumptions of the environmental perspective is rather 
different than those of intergovernmental theory and rational choice institutionalism. 
Rather than viewing Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation as rational 
processes, it seeks to uncover the myths and ideas that may cause such a change in 
the Commission and its relations with the Parliament. How are the legitimising 
organisational forms of the broader society reflected in the reforms of the European 
Union? As seen in chapter two, the ideas of parliamentarism and a strong President or 
chief executive can both be said to be prevalent in the broader institutional 
environment of the European Union. To what degree has these assumptions been 
corroborated by the data? To what extend can the processes be seen as driven 
forwards by ideas and norms rather than rational actors?   How can these ideas be 
seen as the driving forces for the growing dependence of the Commission on the will 
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of the European Parliament and the strengthening of the Presidential prerogatives 
within the Commission?  
The myth of Presidentialisation  
Chapter three showed us that the recent Treaty revisions have strengthened the 
presidential traits of the European Commission, enhancing the prerogatives of the 
chief executive. Can the data corroborate the assumptions of chapter two owing the 
changes to a European wide trend?  
As seen, the President of the Commission is gaining in influence, and has a role one 
might say go well beyond the traditional primus inter pares. As compared to the 
growing influence of the Parliament, the arguments used to strengthen the role of the 
Commission President have been much more explicit and functional in nature, both 
from the member states and the Commission in itself, corroborating the rational 
perspectives.  However, as seen in chapter two, myths are often rationalised and 
institutionalised, and may take on a functional nature. Strengthening the President 
may therefore be seen as an idea based solution for the problems the Commission was 
facing. However, if one looks at the data, the strengthening of the presidential 
prerogatives was only one of many options the member states considered when 
adapting the institutional framework of the Union. This may have won through 
because it was seen as the best option, owing this to the myth of Presidentialisation. 
On the other hand, from an intergovernmental perspective the final result of the IGC 
may only be seen as the lowest common denominator, or a reflection of the relative 
power of the member states. Unfortunately, the data can neither verify nor falsify 
these postulations, and this section raises more questions than it provides answers.   
Another interesting fact is that the Commission itself seems to argue for two partially 
incompatible structures. It has argued for the strengthening of the President, using 
functional arguments. However, at the same time, it argues for the upkeep of the 
collegial traits, especially in their relations with the Parliament. One might therefore 
question whether this may be the result of incompatible myths. On the other hand, in 
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a rational perspective collegiality may be seen as a way to avoid scrutiny. Moreover, 
both tendencies can have resulted from a wish to enhance the legitimacy of the 
Commission. I will return to this in the following section.  
The myth of Parliamentarisation  
The role of the Parliament is one of the unanswered questions left from the rational 
perspectives.  Why would the member states extend the roles and functions of the 
Parliament? Employing a strictly rational assumption one might suggest that their 
power over the Commission was extended in order for the two institutions to control 
each other. Could there be a normative explanation?  
As seen with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the member states were already in agreement 
to extend the role of the Parliament in the election of the Commission. Furthermore, 
an informal procedure was already established between the Parliament and the 
Commission. The data suggests that there was little discussion about this, and the 
Parliament has been given a much larger say in the policies of the Union through it’s 
participation in decision making. This might suggest that the increased influence by 
the Parliament was taken for granted, thus corroborating the postulation of the 
environmental perspective. However, though this may be said to build on the idea of 
parliamentarism, and the legitimating effect of an increase of parliamentary 
influences, one can not exclude the possibility that this was motivated by rational 
calculations. As Rittberger (2005) points out in his analysis of European Parliament, 
this may be a way for the member states to fill the ‘legitimacy deficit’. Unfortunately, 
my data can neither verify nor falsify this statement.  
The analyses above have shown that the Parliament may be said to have rationally 
extended its role and functions throughout the Amsterdam and Nice processes.  
However, the notion of legitimacy has also been used as the institution extended its 
own role. As the practises of the Commission and Parliament were written down in 
inter-institutional agreements, it was done to enhance the legitimacy of the 
Commission. The two structures have previously been separate, and the fact that this 
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was used as an argument may be said to corroborate the assumption of the myth 
based perspective. The idea that the Commission would gain legitimacy as it makes 
itself more dependent on the will of the Parliament is based on the idea of a 
parliamentary chain of responsibility. Nonetheless, drawing on the rational 
perspective the data can not exclude that this was done rationally. The Commission 
may be seen to gain legitimacy for its own work by submitting itself to the will of 
directly elected, and thus legitimated,  European Parliament. 
This interpretation is further supported by the inter-institutional relations we see 
develop within the EU. They differ from those of the member states legislative 
assemblies and executive branches. Ideology seems to be of lesser importance, and as 
seen when the Parliament scrutinised the Barroso Commission-nominees, it was seen 
as a crisis, not parliamentarism in the making. However, though the practises of the 
European Union may be different from those we find in the member states, this does 
not exclude the possibility that the ideas have influenced the institutional choices 
made. As seen in chapter two, myths are often adapted as they move from one 
organisation to the next. On this note I move to concluding remarks.  
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6. Putting the pieces together 
As I present my concluding remarks I would like to return to the questions put 
forwards in the introduction. Why have we seen a parallel strengthening of the 
presidential prerogatives and the parliamentary influences over the Commission? Has 
it been a process driven forwards by the member states of the Union, the European 
institutions or is it merely a reflection of legitimising concepts?  
As seen these questions were not taken from the top of my head, but founded in the 
theoretical framework of European and organisational studies. Employing 
intergovernmental theory, I have shown that the member states still retain the formal 
power to revise the Treaty framework, and may still claim the right to be referred to 
as the primary actors. As seen, through intergovernmental conferences they have 
successfully strengthened the position of the Commission Presidency, while at the 
same time limiting the influences of the Parliament over the Commission. Employing 
rational choice institutional assumptions on the data has yielded partly conflicting 
results. Putting focus on the adaptation of the formal provisions, this interpretation 
shows that the institutions influence their own roles and functions as they maximise 
their mandates. Both the presidential prerogative to ask a Commissioner to leave and 
the parliamentary prerogative to ask the commissioner-nominees to appear before a 
committee, originated outside the intergovernmental conferences. The third and final 
analysis has shown that not only were norms and ideas used as arguments for the 
Presidentialisation and Parliamentarisation of the Commission, they seem to be used 
to legitimise the institutions.  
However, as argued in chapter two, the scope of these analyses was not to strengthen 
one theoretical perspective while disproving the others, but rather try to construct a 
framework to explain the variance in the data. Drawing on this, I believe a full 
understanding of the processes needs to take into account a holistic view of 
institutional change. We need to include the formal negotiations, but also the 
informal adaptations and the inter-institutional relations. As seen, in particular with 
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the Parliamentary prerogatives, but also in the way the President of the Commission 
gained the prerogative to dismiss a Commissioner, the member states have chosen a 
restricted formal framework. At the same time working arrangements are adapted and 
inter-institutional arrangements are negotiated, extending the Treaty framework. Thus 
we need that more is gained by making use of a broad perspective on arenas.  
Furthermore, for a deeper understanding of the processes taking place, we need to 
employ a broad understanding of actors.  As seen, the member states retain the power 
to negotiate and be the signatories of Treaties, and the Treaties, though loosely, guide 
the work of the Union. Thus the member states may still be viewed as the primary 
actors, retaining an ‘exit strategy’. On the other hand, as seen, the informal adaptation 
of the Treaty framework can not be explained by employing a strict member state 
oriented perspective. The institutions may not have the prerogative to freely alter 
their mandates, but they are influential in adapting them, and as the data show, they 
enjoy a large degree of freedom when doing so.  
The strengthening of the Presidential prerogatives and the Parliamentary traits in 
particular, shows that a strict rational assumption falls short. As shown above, the 
perspectives have problems explaining why the member states and the European 
Commission voluntarily yield power to a European Parliament.  Though the data may 
not be able to verify the assumptions of the environmental perspective, the strictly 
rational perspectives display problems and the normative perspective provides a 
solution for this. However, further research is necessary to underpin this.   
On an interesting note, though both the President of the Commission and the 
Parliament has seen an increase in their formal prerogatives, not all provisions have 
been put to use. As seen, the President of the Commission has yet to ask a 
Commissioner to leave. Furthermore, most of the provisions for the relationship 
between the Parliament and the Commission have never been used. The 
strengthening of their formal position vis-à-vis the Commission may therefore not 
encompass all aspects of the inter-institutional relations. As the Santer crisis showed 
us, making use of formal provisions is not an absolute requirement for influence over 
 84 
the processes. The Parliament forced the Commission to leave without formally 
undertaking a vote of censure.   
Limits to the study 
Following the parameters of this thesis, the range of the analysis has been limited.  
However, it has become clear that the scope needs to be widened for a full 
understanding of these processes. The data give a clear indication that the processes 
go further back in time, though the changes have occurred recently. For future 
analyses, a historic perspective should be added, basing its assumptions on the 
postulations of historical institutionalism.  
Furthermore, the data suggests that the actors need to be broken down to smaller 
entities. By opening up the category of ‘member states’, we could gain a better 
understanding of the processes that have caused a strengthening of the Commission 
Presidency and the European Parliament. As the data has shown, there have at times 
been broad disagreements on the institutional issues, and an opening up of the 
assumptions on member states could yield valuable information on the 
Parliamentarisation and Presidentialisation of the Commission. Moreover, in my 
analysis the Commission has been treated as a whole. The scope of this study did not 
allow for such data to be gathered, but it can be expected that the Presidents have 
influenced their role and they may have had motives to extend the prerogatives of the 
Commission Presidency. An inclusion of data on the President’s would increase the 
value of the study. Information would also be gained by opening up the assumption 
of the Parliament as a unitary actor, exploring differences among the political groups 
as well as along national lines. Moreover, by introducing data on a lower level we 
might be able to gain a better understanding of the normative aspects of the 
institutional changes. Furthermore, opening up the assumptions of the multitude of 
actors involved could disclose coalitions amongst them, uncovering powerful and less 
powerful clusters of actors across the arenas.  The remarks above point out that 
further research is needed for a full understanding of the Parliamentarisation and 
Presidentialisation of the Commission.  
 85
Parliamentarisation and Presidentiaisation: is this the end?  
On this note I conclude with remarks on the key concepts of this analysis. As shown 
in chapter three the institutional changes within the Commission and its relations 
with the European Parliament points towards both a Presidentialisation and 
Parliamentarisation of the Commission. On the other hand, the Commission still 
highly value collegiality, and Commission-Parliament relations are still different from 
those of the member states. However, the typology has shown to be a well adept tool 
to elucidate the institutional workings of the Union. Will it be so in the future?  
As pointed out in the introduction, the Commission is far from static in its nature, and 
I don’t expect this process has found its end just yet. As seen in chapter three, the 
Reform Treaty will take the European Union one step closer towards a parliamentary 
system. Not only will we see the continuation of a hierarchical system, we will also 
welcome new institutional structures. Moreover, the increasing influences of the 
member state parliaments may add a whole new level to ideal model of a European 
parliamentary system. However, as the analyses undertaken suggests, it is difficult to 
predict the effects of the new provisions before they have been put to use.  It is 
therefore with excitement that I await 2009 and 2014. 
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